A list of books in this series will be found at the end of the volume.

BELONGING IN THE TWO BERLINS

Kin, state, nation

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constructions. They saw virtue in work, and pensions and free time were understood as rights earned in exchange for labor. Prosperity forms the integument of West German identity, enabling them to erase their pasts, both in memory and physically, and to allay their fears of disorder and dirt, both of which were largely absent in pre-unity West Berlin/West Germany. They also saw this prosperity as compensation for their victimization, and linked its gradual achievement to the periods and categories of state: most importantly, the currency reform and consumer goods obtained through the *Wirtschaftswunder*.

Members of Generation I remained loyal to *Deutschstämmligkeit*, categories of blood and kin, consanguinity and affinity, which were understood to be *Ur-deutsch* and natural. A relativization of these categories was feared because it would open up the possibility for a definition of Germanness as multicultural, hence an inclusion of the guestworkers who had been brought to West Germany to sustain the *Wirtschaftswunder*. The kin model of the *Hausfrauenehe*, while serving men well, did not always serve the interests of women of Generation I. Why didn't they complain more? Some in fact did. But the large majority of citizens benefited to some extent from the general prosperity; and certainly the standard of living was far better than that of their East comrades, which was, after all, the comparison that counted. Women of Generation I, whose self-confidence was never that great and whose participation was never encouraged, tacitly participated in the postwar deal, much as they did in the bargains that sustained the Third Reich — although, as we shall see in the following chapter, their daughters were now talking up and speaking out.

### 8

**Politicized kinship in West Berlin: Generation II**

We now turn to the life reconstructions of one final group: West Berlin Generation II, born approximately between 1940 and 1955. My interview partners from this generation showed considerably more diversity in their lifecourse trajectories and kinship practices than did members of the other generations examined in this study, but a diversity more apparent in the problems encountered than in the solutions to them. Reasons for this are twofold. First, unlike their parents, they experienced as adults no “total event,” such as war or famine; and unlike their GDR counterparts, who grew up in a social and state context that was relatively uniform from district to district, they experienced their childhoods in different *Bundesländer* governed by a decentralized state. Second, most of my acquaintances in West Berlin were not native to the city, as was the case in East Berlin also. The foreign-born nature of Berliners has always been one of the city’s peculiarities. In 1905, 40 percent of its residents were foreign born; in 1946, the last census to be carried out in the entire city, the number increased to 48 percent (Berlin 1988: 7), and since then has certainly increased. The majority of people I knew had initially moved there to study, others to enjoy some aspect of Berlin’s anomaly status (to avoid army service, join progressive social movements, take advantage of business opportunities or tax breaks) — a range of conditions, when considered as a whole, unique to West Berlin. Hence West Berliners of this generation were a highly selected population, a group more dynamic personally and politically than one might find in the Federal Republic.

Yet, once in West Berlin, members of Generation II began to formulate, to a surprising degree, common responses to their collective problems, a striking uniformity that, regardless of the nuances regarding
their own forms of societal participation, can be seen in their self narratives of the late eighties. They articulate this generational collective conscience with regard to several mass movements: e.g., a working-class mass pop movement in the late fifties (the Halbstarken), a student rebellion, initially including some young workers, in 1968 (the Achtundsechziger), and a successful political party (the Alternative Liste, known outside West Berlin as the Greens) in the late seventies – all firsts in postwar German history. These social movements not only created generational unity, but also served and continued to serve to demarcate this group from the generation of their parents and the one that follows them. While Generation I very consciously pursued demarcation from the lifecourse of East Berliners, Generation II inherited and internalized this demarcation without purposefully constructing it, as we shall see. Because the process of generational identity-building in West Berliners, Generation II inherited and internalized this demarcation without purposefully constructing it, as we shall see. Because the process of generational identity-building in West Berlin had been, on the whole, a very conscious affair, “generational coherence” was perhaps the most salient characteristic of West Berliners of Generation II.

In narrating their lifecourse, members of Generation II relied primarily on their own participation in or identification with social movements in periodizing their histories. This periodization was quite different from that of their parents, who tended to appropriate the periods of the state and further define them in terms of corresponding consumption items of a personal – not collective – nature. The categories of Generation II, however, were formulated in close interaction with and reaction to the normalization techniques of their elders and the state. The lapsarian state strategy of the FRG – “It’s all in the Basic Law!” – and the refusal by the state to experiment in the fifties and sixties, to imagine a new future, made many if not most of Generation II (including those who had formerly lived in the GDR) suspect as subversives. Moreover, the assimilative strategy of the state, its attempt to incorporate Generation II automatically into an already established hierarchy, regarding them as of the same substance (deutschstämmig) as their elders, produced a counter-reaction among Generation II, who wanted both to see themselves as different and to constitute democratically a new basis for group membership. Hence the narrative of Generation I and its state, both of whom read themselves as virtuous, with an authority anchored in tradition, was set on a collision course with their offspring, bent, as they were, on autonomy, anarchy, and experimentatation.

Generational conflict at the end of the war began with negative definitions of youth gangs by elders and by representatives of the proto-state; it later crystallized in the three successive movements mentioned above. For Generation II the 1950s were not categorized primarily in terms of prosperity, but rather as a period of domestication. By the mid sixties the domestic group itself was a politically contested category, and by the seventies so were the Wirtschaftswunder, work, and what had been dubbed the Konsumgesellschaft, the consensus categories key to the identity of members of Generation I. This confrontation slowly lost its edge as the state began pursuing a policy of desentimentalization, and members of Generation II began assuming positions within the state machinery. At the end of the seventies, the major points of ideological opposition between Generations I and II tended to revolve around a set of categories omitted in the allegorized versions of Germanness narrated by Generation I: Nazism and class structure (or hierarchy). Generation II forced these two categories into public discourse. Their particular domestic history, which itself structured much of the political history after the mid sixties, redefined the key categories of marriage, kin, friends and lovers, work and free time, and consequently, what it meant to be German.

Youth domestication
From the end of the war up to approximately 1950, children and youths experienced a similar anarchy and freedom from everyday routine in both East and West. Many of the oldest members of Generation II lost one or both of their parents during the war. Except for some people in the upper classes who often managed to avoid military service, most Berliners lost kin during or after the war. Illness, death, and migration restructured the domestic unit. Instability and flux at home, along with a general loss of authority accompanying the German defeat and the Allied occupation, contributed to a breakdown in hierarchy and a perception by children and youths that the rules and conventions of traditional authority no longer had to be respected.

The “emergency situation” of the postwar period, as it was called at the time, was subject to different evaluations by social scientists, which, in turn, fed back into people’s conceptions of what they were experiencing. This I discussed in chapter 7. What should be emphasized here, however, is that most scientific accounts, while condemning Nazism and at least certain aspects of the patriarchal family, nonetheless supported the model of the Hausfrauenehe, with its prescribed roles for housewife-mother, working father, and children, as an official version of the lifecourse. Men and women of Generation II appropriated this
model neither as an ideal nor as a description of reality corresponding to their natal units. Rather than modelling their life-course around the legal institution of marriage, West Berliners of Generation II in their reconstructions tended to narrate their lives in terms of confrontations with legitimate order and the pursuit of pleasure. The household and domestic group were thus secondary categories that were organized with respect to conceptions of legitimate order and pleasure.

Questions about what constituted legitimate order entered public discourse, framed as a generational problem, even before the end of the war, in what came to be known as “youth criminality.” Often encouraged by mothers, fathers away fighting the war (and later in POW camps), nearly all youths in Berlin engaged in property or petty theft, illegal activities involving mostly lifecell provisions and heating materials. After the war, the Allies tried to crack down on these youths, and in particular were suspicious of former Hitler youth members involved in such activities. These police actions provoked protests by youths against parents who had often encouraged them to join the Nazis, and, after the war, to steal provisions for the family. The Allies elicited parental support, for without their cooperation control of the children would be impossible. The fight over domestication of the youth crystalized in school reorganization, which was also supposed to be part of the denazification mandated by the Potsdam Accords.

**Education reform**

A major difference between the education systems in the East and West as they developed and were experienced by Generation II lay in the perception of their role within power hierarchies in the two systems. In East Berlin, the family was integrated into the school system run by the state, and the children were told they were responsible for the future. Thus the parents in the East, much more than the children, resented the state and the schools for usurping their authority. In West Berlin, the school was regarded as an instrument of the parents, aided by the state, to integrate the child into an orderly family.1 Thus the children in the West, not the parents, resented the state and the schools. These different initial alliances resulted in specific configurations and alignments that became more regularized and institutionalized over time.

Progressive school reformers in West Berlin were both greater in number and under more political pressure for Abgrenzung from the East than in West Germany. Suspected of placating communists and radical reformers on the one hand, and forced to reassure conservative elements of the population on the other, West Berlin school reformers were continually forced to compromise on their goals. Between 1945 and 1947, a joint, comprehensive school reform was planned for the entire city of Berlin. Increasing enmity between the Allies in 1948 prevented the enactment of these reforms in West Berlin. Thereafter, liberal school reformers in the West were on the defensive; progressive school reform became hostage to the Cold War, and the restorative, authoritarian function of the schools again came to the fore.

Hannelore König commented on how she experienced this early period:

I should say that [during the last years of the war] we had become more autonomous, but then [we] were again oppressed. Namely, that was in the school. You had to again obey orders, yes, you had to again knuckle under. Corporal punishment was done away with, but you still had to be submissive. You were again oppressed. Anyway, our generation was.

*(Meyer and Schulze 1984: 127)*

Despite the pressure from the Cold War, West Berlin authorities managed to carry school reforms further than did the other West German Bundesländer, increasing the length of mandatory schooling for all and removing some obstacles to access by disadvantaged children. Education authorities enacted a scaled-down version of the proposed Einheitsschule, uniform school system, between 1948 and 1950, and constructed a special “Berlin school” between 1951 and 1954. Thereafter reform attempts were unsuccessful until 1972, when more pragmatic and piece-meal reform began to open up university education to women and to children from poor and working-class backgrounds.

Initial debate over school reform centered on the education of talented children and admittance to the wissenschaftliche Oberschule, scientific high school. In a radio speech from 1949, a Berlin education expert summarized the debate: “The problem of selection of talented children is as lively disputed as is the concept of talent itself. Certainly, nearly all parents maintain that they have prematurely talented children.” Parents did not want their talented children mixing with working-class kids, fearing that “my talented child will be held back in his development by the masses of untalented children” (Füssl and Kubina 1982: 45–46, 48). In this period, the crucial concern of the schools was to reestablish hierarchy; that concern took the form of a debate over the nurturing of talent – a substance ascribed from birth and not learned. Schools with an open learning atmosphere, where different social
classes mix, it was feared, might actually taint and spoil the inherited talent.

Even before the founding of the state in 1949, debate over education reform was held hostage to the political needs of Abgrenzungspolitik, infecting all discussion and preventing attempts at reform. In a letter to city Mayor Walter May in January 1948, Wilhelm Blume expressed the sentiment of many parents: “Are you unaware, your honored Mayor, that the Berlin Einheitsschulsystem resembles to a threatening degree the East school system? And that it increasingly deviates from the school system in other Bundesländer?” (cited in Füssl and Kubina 1982: 79). The official line was that “resemblance” with the East in any respect was “threatening” to the establishment of a distinct West German identity. In their reconstructions, members of Generation II frequently commented on three aspects of their education: its hierarchical nature, the pressure to be anti-communist, and the authoritarian nature of their teachers.

Astrid, six years old at the time of the schools’ reopening in Berlin and now a psychologist, explained from the experiential side of the education system in Berlin:

I never went to school willingly, never. I never enjoyed it. The boys and girls were divided. And I’m sure the girls were treated more severely. We had to do the same drills in the school recesses as we had to do in the Nazi period, mainly, run around the middle of the courtyard in an orderly line. The smaller ones couldn’t keep up; they were punished afterward; there was lots of punishment – corporal punishment hadn’t yet been abolished in the schools. I remember some parents asking the teachers to be especially hard on their children, to discipline them more severely. There was one teacher who was definitely an old Nazi, so authoritarian. All of my teachers were authoritarian teachers, in fact. Nearly all were women, many quite old women. But I hardly remember. And curriculum? I had to do sewing, cooking, learn to be a housewife. The men, on the other hand, had to learn either auto mechanics or a practical skill.

Astrid emphasized aspects of gender division and authoritarianism in her education. Much like many of her peers with whom I spoke, she did not mention anti-communism and the Abgrenzungspolitik of the time. This aspect of experience was recovered only when I asked about it. During the fifties and sixties, the policy of demarcation from the East was often expressed through avoidance: no mention was made of the GDR (it was called the Ostzone), and until the seventies maps continued to show the boundaries of the Reich from 1937.

Yet, while Astrid and her generation learned to avoid the GDR as a geographical, cultural, and political unit, their education took place within a context of official confrontation with it. Before speaking out on issues, educators were required to distance themselves from policy in the East in a manner similar to how East German educators were required to begin every speech with citations from Marx and Engels. In a text addressing proposed reforms, written in March 1960 by Berlin educator Carl-Heinz Evers, the “Bolshevik ideology” in the East that aimed to educate for the Kollektiv was contrasted with the “autonomy of the personality” in the West. Evers defended a “pluralistic education” and a Martin Buber-inspired “I-thou” dialogue model of understanding (cited in Füssl and Kubina 1982: 104–106). Certainly until the late sixties, educators avoided images of the collective and aspects of collective education, but in the Cold War atmosphere policymakers were better equipped at avoiding through demarcating than at attaining new goals. Progressive West Berlin pedagogues could not attain the stated goals of pluralism, dialogue, and discussion. West Berliners of Generation II, like Astrid, related experiencing the opposite: control, discipline, and repression.

When I asked several members of this generation about why they omitted the debate on Abgrenzung from their reconstructions, they explained that nobody questioned the portrayal of the evil East, and that they absorbed these values as taken for granted. For them, demarcation was doxa, part of the “self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned” (Bourdieu 1977: 166). Many explained that they had no means of articulating a critique: the language simply failed them. One woman commented that only in the late sixties did some of her university classmates have tools necessary for a critical analysis, and more often than not, that critique was initiated by former GDR students who had been exposed to readings from Marx and Engels. Not until the late sixties did Marxist discourse reenter West German academic life, and some students began to articulate a critique of the role of the academy in reproducing hierarchy.

The limits of domestication: the Halbstarken
In the early fifties, parents, local authorities, and Western Allies worked together to discipline and domesticate adventurous children and youths, a scenario that was quite different from what the youths experienced in the East. The reasons for this difference are several. First, particularly troublesome or dissatisfied youths in the East moved West, depriving
the East of its most critical voices and thus of a necessary social impetus in the long run. But in the short run, this exodus of unruly youths eliminated a police problem for the East — and created a problem for West German authorities, who had nowhere to exile their critics. Second, youths in the East were immediately absorbed from the education system into the labor market. Youth unemployment in West Berlin remained exceptionally high through the fifties. Not until 1959 did West Germany enter a period of nearly full employment (lasting until 1973); West Berlin, in fact, did not substantially reduce its youth unemployment until the early sixties (Lampert 1988: 17). Third, in East Germany, the state made an early alliance with the youths (often against the will of their parents) organising youth activities and extending educational opportunities, offering social incorporation and advancement to both sexes and to children of all social classes, often through affirmative-action type programs. The state-identified authorities in West Berlin, as described above, allied themselves with the parents against the rebellious children. Generation I wanted, above all, normalcy: that meant silencing unruly youths and assimilating them into a community that looked to the past, to tradition, to elders, for its authority. Accustomed to the anarchy of their childhood and excluded from political activity, by the mid sixties West German youths became increasingly conscious of the way in which they were being normalized and marginalized.

In less than three decades, social movements comprised of different members of this generation arose successively out of reaction and resistance to these normalization pressures. The first such movement was working class in origin, the Halbstarken, half strong, and, as with the other social movements that followed it, organized in terms of domestic categories. Unlike the movements that came later, however, it did not spread to other social classes and it did not articulate political goals.

The Halbstarken appeared first in early 1955 in West Berlin when groups of up to twenty youths on motorcycles began gathering in doorways and orderly public places to randalieren, make a stink. Comprised of nearly all working-class boys (although girls were not totally excluded), they gathered on street corners, at playgrounds, or in local bars, dressed in black leather jackets if they could find them, “especially harrass(ing) young girls with words or even with actions.” The goal, according to accounts of participants, was merely “thrill and excitement” (Bondy 1957: 9).

Alienated by the contradiction between their own unemployment in the late fifties — true especially for the working class — and the growing economy and visible improvement in living standards for others, many usually compliant youths began to rebel. Coupled with this abysmal work situation was the political–domestic attempt to restore the authority of the father, even if he wasn’t there, and to return to “respectable authority relationships” (Bondy 1957: 62). Although, in its heyday from 1955 to 1960, only approximately one-fifth of all youths were involved in the Halbstarken, the movement became an identification symbol for those bored or disaffected by the “No Experiment” political motto of the conservative Adenauer regime. From April to October 1956 in Berlin, 445 youths took part in Krawalle, rabble-rousing, among whom only 17 were girls. Girls made up 2 to 5 percent of those identified with the movement, and numbered approximately 5 to 12 percent of those involved in rabble-rousing incidents (Bondy 1957: 53).

Models for the Halbstarken came from the United States. Although the West German regime officially welcomed all things coming from the United States having to do with the political model, they frowned on aspects of American pop culture, often introduced by the Occupation troops. Several members of Generation II told me that their first exposure to Americans was to black GIs, and some even had their first sexual experience with American black men. Having been told by their parents that the Americans were their friends (unlike the Russians, from whom they were to run), they were shocked when their parents used racist grounds to forbid them from having contact with Americans. Many members of Generation I pointed to how their parents had praised and identified with the Amis, but yet held race categories to be more important than national ones.

Indeed the pop culture that so captivated the youth came from American black culture, especially jazz, rock and roll, and new forms of dance. Yet the pop cultural icons most salient in bringing black culture into public discourse were still primarily white Americans. The music of Elvis Presley, who himself served as an occupying soldier in West Germany, and the films of James Dean and Marlon Brando functioned as super-models for a whole generation. Rock-and-roll music became the rage — with its aggressive, sexual themes and its loud, driving rhythms, so very different from traditional German musical forms expressed in low and high culture: the popular middle-class Schlager, the polka and waltz, classical music and opera. With its boundary-breaking gender conventions, new clothing and moving styles, and
challenge to racial categories, the Halbstarken served simultaneously as a proud generational demarcator for the young and disenchanted and a provocation and threat to the established order.

Mass media and the social-scientific community immediately condemned the movement, trying effectively to denigrate it but thereby ironically giving it publicity and making it into something more glamorous and adventurous than it in fact was. Even the Council on Europe in a 1960 report passed judgment on the movement, which was not limited to West Germany, concluding that the goal of the Halbstarken was “to destroy family life” (Fischer-Kowalski 1983: 58).

In reconstructions of former activists, they emphasized the importance of rebellion against the everyday. One woman remembered, “And our concept, which we and other people always used, was spießig [small, narrow-mindedness]. Not simply Spießer [someone who fits those characteristics], but to be spießig! That was the key word. For us, it was important to have a jazz basement and not to have fun in some nice bourgeois thing. We acted against our parents, against Spießtum [the act of being spießig], that meant breaking out.” (Dietz 1985: 36). And break out, indeed, they did.

The politicization of domesticity

“1968” is a magical year for Generation II, many of whom call themselves Achtundsechziger, sixty-eighers, for that was the year when a critique narrowed to the politics of domestic life broadened into a political critique of the West German state. The formal politicization and reemployment of domestic experience might even be precisely dated to 1969, when the so-called hedonistische Linke, hedonistic Left, split off from the Politgenossen, political comrades. To understand “1968” one must go back to the international relations of the fifties, specifically to the relationship of Germans to Americans, which were nowhere in Europe so intimate and multidimensional as in Berlin. As just described above, many West Germans of Generation II, not only the Halbstarken, modeled themselves on the American “beat generation” of the fifties. In doing so, they developed nonconventional styles in dress and tastes in music repellent to their parents, who also, as it was, identified with the Americans, but decidedly not with American youth culture. Through the cultivation of a taste for jazz and rock and a new aesthetic of appearance, German youth embraced a new semiotic: visual images and sounds that inverted the everyday categories of their elders. They disputed the meaning of neatness, cleanliness, discipline, order – values that embodied the very essence of Germanness at that time.

The reaction of Generation I and the state to this behavioral and sartorial assault was anything but measured. In the words of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, the Christian Democratic leader who had replaced Konrad Adenauer in the early sixties, “So long as I govern, I’ll do everything I can to destroy this nuisance” (Aust 1989: 38). Aggressive metaphors of attack, destruction, and war characterized the discourse of both the state and their opponents within Generation II. Yet the beatniks and their followers, who were students and non-students alike, did not initially formulate political demands and attack the state. Instead, their critique was cultural, expressed in a geste of signs subverting domestic life; it preceded by several years the development of a political critique, articulated verbally by another sub-group of Generation II, mostly students. These two groups did not begin to interact with one another until after the visit of the Shah of Iran and his West German-born wife to West Berlin in 1967, an event that radicalized Generation II in its self-conception. What the Halbstarken initiated in challenging sartorial and behavioral convention, the sixty-eighers continued to develop, supplementing it with what Adorno and Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School called Ideologiekritik, an explanation of the sources of the dominant ideology. This critical theory was oriented to a holistic critique of society, Gesellschaftskritik, and saw the state as integrated into, not apart from, the society.

“Wohngemeinschaften” and otherness in household structure

Postwar households in West Berlin were in a constant state of flux largely because the city itself was being continually reterritorialized with new peoples, buildings, and spaces. Until the building of the Wall, people of all ages tended to leave West Berlin for the Federal Republic. Many were well-to-do residents and left behind large apartments that were then available for cheap rent. This movement from Berlin to West Germany reversed itself after 1961, when young people leaving their natal homes in the FRG began moving to West Berlin. As mentioned earlier, most of my discussion partners in the West as well as in the East were not born in Berlin. Reasons for coming to Berlin tended to be fourfold: first, the desire to get away from parents; second, to study; third, to enjoy Berlin’s social and night life; and fourth, among young men, to escape military service. Because of West Berlin’s special status under the Potsdam Accords, young men with a permanent residence in
West Berlin could not be forced to serve in the military or to perform alternate service, that was, unless they again moved from Berlin to live in West Germany. Whatever the reason for the move to Berlin, people made it consciously; rarely did members of Generation II say they were in Berlin by fate or accident.

By the end of the sixties, many young people in Berlin were living in Wohngemeinschaften (WGs), large apartments formerly inhabited by the wealthy. These unconventional living arrangements were initially unique to Berlin where the rent for such large spaces was very low by West German standards. Some of these WGs developed into communes, the first of which, Kommune 1, was founded at the end of 1967. Their goal was “to revolutionize the bourgeois individual” and to develop their sexual needs unfettered by societal norms (Brügge 1988: 78-96). With the transformation of some WGs into communes, household structures, which up to that point had been determined by marriage and residence needs, were suddenly also organized around sexual interests and friendship needs.

Wohngemeinschaften, communes, and collectives never became the mean household form in West Berlin, although it is likely that every member of Generation II experienced them, if only as party guests. They did, however, increase dramatically, by 277 percent for the whole FRG between 1972 and 1982, with perhaps two or three times that number in West Berlin (Nave-Herz 1988: 64). The household form that grew the most numerically, though, was the single person; the one that declined the most was the nuclear pair with children. Both the increase in single-person and decline in nuclear-family households was centrally related to experience with the WGs. The interrelationship of these different living arrangements is best illustrated by presenting six prototypical examples, indicating the range and historical specificity of how West Berliners of Generation II experienced changing household forms.

Hans-Peter, born in 1948, moved with his parents to West Berlin from West Germany in 1950. His parents divorced in 1952, whereafter he gradually lost contact with his father. His mother remarried in 1958, but he never developed a significant relationship with his mother’s second husband who, in any case, divorced her in 1968. At the age of nineteen, Hans-Peter moved into an apartment with two male school friends; two years later they moved into a WG with one other man and two women. All six were students at the Free University. The WG changed its members and the form of their relationships over time. Most changes in membership, said Hans-Peter, were provoked by heterosexual couples who wanted to move into private apartments. They were always replaced by singles, mostly students. The WG was large enough to offer a room to visiting guests, many of whom were from the United States. Sexual partners, both male and female, were brought into the WG and members often had sex with each other, either in the context of an intensified relationship or in an orgy. In 1979, Hans-Peter moved into the apartment of his girlfriend, with whom he still lives. Since 1988, he has had another woman friend he visits several times a week and with whom he occasionally vacations. He continues to visit his former WG, now inhabited by two male lovers.

Helene, born in 1947, moved from East Berlin to Prague in 1967, from Prague to Vienna in 1968, from Vienna to West Berlin in 1972. She lived with her mother and her father in a small East German town until 1963, moved to East Berlin to go to school in 1967, married a Czech citizen six months later in order to join her (female) lover in Prague. Her husband promptly left Czechoslovakia to seek asylum in West Germany. She then married an Austrian and moved there with her lover until 1972. She and her lover then moved to West Berlin.

Anne-Marie, born in 1939 in East Prussia, was raised by married parents until her father joined the war effort in 1943. In 1944, she fled with her mother, grandmother, younger sister, and four other women to parts of what became East Germany, moving from farmhouse to farmhouse for nearly two years. They finally settled in a refugee camp in Bavaria, where she lived with the all-women group until 1950, when her father returned from a POW camp. She lived together in a small town with her father, mother, and younger sister until 1961. Shortly after the Wall went up, she moved to Berlin “in search of excitement” — she also went to the university there. She lived in a boarding house for her first three years in Berlin, then met her future husband, also a student at the Free University. They moved into an apartment together in 1965, married the following year, and then lived together in communal apartments until their son was born in 1968, after which time they moved into a private apartment. In 1982, they bought the floor of the house they were living in.

Gerhard, born in 1951 near Cologne, lived with his mother, father, and younger brother until he passed the Abitur in 1970. He then moved to West Berlin to avoid military service and to study film. Between 1970 and 1976, he lived in three WGs, each with a different mix of men and women, the largest group numbering seven. In 1977, he and another male friend, Frank, started their own WG in a four-bedroom apartment; in 1981, they moved to a seven-bedroom apartment, which they shared with three
women. One of the rooms was used as a guest room, in which I was also once a guest. Two of the women had regular visiting (male) friends with whom they had nearly monogamous sexual relations; Gerhard and Frank both had girlfriends who visited them occasionally, with whom they also had sexual relationships. Gerhard reported that he and Frank had a sexual relationship with each other for short periods several times in the past. They both viewed the current WG structure as a permanent arrangement.

Barbara, born in 1941, was raised by her mother in a small town in the middle of West Germany. She married in early 1961 and moved six months later to Berlin, where her husband had obtained employment. After two years in an apartment, they bought a house in a Berlin suburb. She had a son in 1965. Her husband left the household in 1974, whereafter they lived in separate households. They both explained that they never divorced because “we just never bothered to.” Her son found an apartment of his own in 1988.

Petra, born in 1953 in East Germany, moved with her mother to Hamburg, FRG, in 1956. She moved to Berlin in 1970, and found an apartment for herself. In 1973, she entered the university and has since studied part-time and “jobbed.” Between 1978 and 1980, she shared an apartment with a female friend, but then decided to live alone in the apartment. In 1984, she decided to have a baby. She has raised it alone, though she often relies on her female friends.

It may be impossible to isolate any single variable that organized the transformations in household structure of this generation. If, however, any motivating principle stands out, it is the drive for autonomy, which led to self-fulfillment and heterogeneous patterns. Heterogeneity itself might be considered a generative category, an over-arching trope, producing the following structural changes: first, participation in many different living arrangements, including the WG movement, marked the lifecourse of nearly every Berliner; second, the inter-generational household had all but disappeared, at most two generations shared a home for limited periods of time; third, marriage no longer organized household structure, but was itself organized by other factors, such as childcare, the fluidity of sexual practices and love, and the extension of kin to categories not related to affinity and consanguinity. We will return to a discussion of these factors later in this chapter.

The surfacing of the past in the political context of 1968
In what context did these household patterns unfold? How did the experiences of kinship relate to politics and the political context of 1968? The politicization of Generation II grew out of a critique of the lack of an anti-fascist policy by the conservative and popular Christian Democratic governments in the fifties and early sixties. Not only did the Adenauer and Erhard regimes, with American support, ignore major provisions of the Potsdam Accords, but they also promoted former Nazis to leading positions in government administration and industry (Engelmann 1981; Niethammer 1988a). In the early fifties in the FRG the term anti-fascist, when used at all, came to mean anti-communist. Authorities usually justified their decisions based on appeals to tradition, the authority of the father, or the constitution (Basic Law). Consequently, when the FDJ, Free German Youth organization, was declared illegal in June 1951, when the Communist Party was banned in 1957 (after years of harassment), and when pacifists (in the fifties), anti-war (in the sixties), and anti-nuclear (in the seventies and eighties) groups were spied upon by West German secret police, the official justifications were always the same, verfassungsfeindlich, enemies of the constitution. This reasoning gave the opponents to authority a very easy target: the state and its representatives.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) followed the Christian Democratic leadership on these issues, so that by the early sixties they increasingly alienated their own youth movement, the SDS (Socialist Students of Germany). Conflict between the SPD and their youth group crystalized around the SDS demand that West Germany stop supporting American involvement in Vietnam. Yet the decisive issue which caused the Social Democrats to kick the SDS group out of the party was their demand that the West German government hold direct parliamentary talks with East Germany. Minimally since the crushing of the East German worker uprising in 1953, the “GDR” had been an issue around which West Germans united, a trope that immediately produced consensus. Now it was being used by the SDS as a critical wedge to divide and differentiate. The more pacified youth organization that the Social Democrats founded shortly thereafter recruited its supporters from among the youngest members of Generation II and the generation that followed them. Attempts to formulate political critiques, a general Ideologiekritik, were centered around a magazine out of Hamburg called konkret, whose chief editor in the early sixties, Ulrike Meinhof, would later become one of the leaders of a radical West German urban guerilla group, the Red Army Faction (RAF).

The event most often referred to in reconstructions as responsible for
creating generational consensus and unity on political issues was the 1967 visit of the Iranian Shah to Berlin. Police brutally repressed student demonstrations protesting West German governmental compliance and support for the Shah's dictatorial policies. During one rally, police opened fire on the crowd, killing Benno Ohnesorg, a pacifist student and member of the Evangelical student organization participating in his first demonstration. Shortly thereafter, in a meeting at the SDS headquarters in Berlin, Gudrun Ensslin, a minister's daughter and soon to become one of the leaders in the RAF, touched a raw nerve of Generation II with her statement: "This fascist state is organized to kill us all. We must organize resistance. Violence can only be answered with violence. They are the generation of Auschwitz - you can't argue with them" (Aust 1989: 54). In the eyes of many in Generation II, their elders, most often including their parents, were to be held accountable for the concentration camps such as Auschwitz, an issue about which their parents had remained silent.

Silence regarding personal participation in the Third Reich thus became a major source of conflict between the generations. Anger was most often specifically directed against the father. In reconstructions, nearly all members of Generation II made reference to how their attempts to discuss the Nazi period with their parents was met with silence, and to how their parents tried to cleanse themselves of the past, symbolically and administratively, through the Persilschein. When newspapers in the fifties printed pictures of concentration camps, parents would often say, "Don't let the paper fall in the hands of the children." For Generation II, the concentration camps, particularly Auschwitz, became a key symbol around which guilt, Germanness, and the identity of Generation I cohered (see Ortner 1973).

Official silence concerning this issue and the complicity of the Christian Democratic government in its suppression were then linked to the policies of the Federal Republic. Silent parents, especially the fathers, became metaphorical equivalents for the state; both state and father being synecdochic for die Vergangenheit, meaning the Nazi past. Auguste Kühn, born in 1936, wrote about how she experienced this symbolic configuration within her family. Her father had returned from the war in the fall of 1945 and her Aunt Friedel, who had spent time in a concentration camp, visited them on several occasions: "[She was] so gaunt that I was initially afraid of her bony appearance. When she began to talk about what she had gone through in those years, I would be sent out of the room and told to play. 'That's not for children."

You'll not be able to sleep because you'll have bad dreams'" (Böll 1985: 126). By the sixties, members of Generation II increasingly broke the taboo concerning discussion of the role of their parents in the Third Reich. Gudrun Ensslin's statement, "They are the generation of Auschwitz - you can't argue with them," became the rallying cry around which a generation united.

In their reconstructions, those West German members of Generation II who experienced any of the events surrounding "1968" tended to be quite unforgiving and critical of their fathers. Even when the father was absent as they grew up, he took on contours over time, and by 1968 he was a real person to be confronted, in particular regarding his Nazi past. Günther Seuren, born in 1932 and therefore several years older than members of Generation II, nonetheless explained forcefully a sentiment regarding fathers that I often heard: "After the war I thought that perhaps my father still lives, somewhere, and he would still be returning home. Perhaps later. As an old man, he would stand before the door and maintain that he is my father." Seuren made it clear that despite the fact his father was dead, he must confront him, if only in an imagined scene, for daddy lived on in his fantasy. "I did not want him to return home," -- the meeting was being forced on him -- "what for? So that I could shake his hand, now empty, the hand with which he used to shoot?" Father's hand, which was to greet him, belonged to a trigger-happy marksman. "I did not want the usual coming home, so that he could one day travel with me abroad. I did not want to look on as he pointed to me with his finger into some area and said: 'My occupation base.'" He did not want to travel with his father through die Vergangenheit.

"Later, I answered the troublesome question about what happened to him by assuming that perhaps he was resting somewhere in a Kameradengrab, grave with his comrades. His people" -- Seuren distinguished his generation from that of his father's -- "would be most happy with his hospitable terminology: everything best accords to the rules in a Kameradengrab. I did not want that he would receive Gnadenbrot, clemency bread, from us." No forgiving! "Our fatherland is not a table at which one can easily sit with well-soaped hands" -- perhaps made sauber by Persil -- "and marvel about the wonder that has come out of the ashes. The Nazis all look much like they speak: 'Truthfully, respectfully, and comradely to members sharing their own blood'" (Böll 1985: 57).

Seuren made it clear that he rejects not only all association with Nazi
crimes, but also with the blood ties, *Blut und Boden*, which inspired and informed Nazi policies. In this short statement he brought together his fundamental opposition to a consensus category of Generation I: a definition of kin or Germanness based on shared blood.

"1968"

Violence between the police and students escalated after the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg in 1967. As students became politicized about the Vietnam War, they increasingly took to the streets in mass protests. The right-wing press used the student demonstrations to mobilize the rest of the population against the student *Krawalle*. For Generation II, Springer publishing house, with its gilded headquarters in a skyscraper built facing the Wall in the Kreuzberg section of Berlin, became a symbol of the conservative forces. Many people told me they were convinced that people at Springer wanted to incite the general population to lynch radical students.

This polemic by the right-wing press did contribute to a near-successful assassination attempt on the student leader Rudi Dutschke. The headlines, covering the entire front page, of the Springer-owned daily *Bild* on February 2, 1968, read, for example, “Stop the terror of the young reds now!” (Chaussy 1985: 54). Shortly thereafter, the *Deutsche Nationalzeitung* wrote “stop Dutschke now. The alternative will be civil war. The order of the day: Stop the left-radical revolution now. Otherwise Germany will become the mecca of all the dissatisfied people of the world.” Under the article they published five photos of Dutschke, representing him from various angles as do the police in their most-wanted lists (Aust 1989: 63). Dutschke was indeed stopped, and never recovered from his bullet wounds, eventually seeking refuge in Denmark.

**Social protest as terrorism: the Red Army Faction and reaction to the state**

The relatively ineffectual student demonstrations led to a splintering of a now-politicized generation into a multitude of factions, with bitter fighting about tactics between the groups, whose memberships and sympathizer bases were extremely fluid and relatively small. The most salient division, in reconstructions, was that between the anarchist groups (e.g., Second of June, Spontis) and the Marxist-Leninist/Maoist groups (*K-Gruppen*). Berlin was known as the *Hochburg der K-Gruppen*, and has maintained this reputation, with the amorphous *Autonome*, which grew out of the late seventies squatters’ movement, carrying on the tradition of random violence and resistance to all forms of authority derived from *Anständigkeit*, respectability.5

Urban terrorism was one of the products of the more Leninist and Maoist of the *K-Gruppen*, culminating in the murder of a hostage in what has since become known as the “German Autumn” of 1977. Public bombings, and later kidnappings, galvanized West German, and to some extent Western European, public opinion against these activities. While active terrorists were few in number, their activities – and the counter-reactions of the state – set the context in which people in Germany lived in the seventies. For members of Generation II, the phenomenon of terrorism, including the reaction of the state to it, was a trope that periodized and figured their narrative of the seventies, giving form to disparate experiences.

In March 1968, Andreas Baader, a member of the culture scene in Berlin, and Gudrun Ensslin, a student, decided to hit capitalism at the heart of one of its symbols. They put bombs in two Frankfurt shopping centers, *Kaufhaus Schneider* and *Kauflhof*. Here, for the first time, a political critique was consciously brought together with a cultural one, and expressed in public action. The way to undermine the political structure, it was thought, was not to attack directly agents of the state, but rather the structures which produced them and which they represented and defended. Accordingly, at the heart of the capitalist culture of the Federal Republic lay consumption, with the large shopping centers as central symbols. Baader, Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and several others formulated a “Concept City Guerilla” manifesto. They called themselves the RAF, *Rote Armee Fraktion*, playing off the romantic association with Mao’s guerilla movement and the dislike of the British Royal Air Force. The British RAF had bombed German cities from without; now a Maoist-type RAF was going to bomb the cities from within the culture.

Throughout its stages of protest, the RAF displayed remarkable continuity in cultural form. They continually relied on symbols significant to German culture, and transformed these symbols in a sequence of acts that followed other sequences within German history. The initial act of Baader and Ensslin was to set a fire to a large shopping center. In Christian symbology, fire is a sign of overcoming, a possible transformation into a new period. Shopping centers, on the other hand, were symbols of *Konsum* to which members of both Generations I and II were attracted and at the same time by which they were repulsed. During the twenties, nearly all large shopping centers were owned by...
wealthy Jews, which the Nazis then used as symbols to rally middle- and lower-middle-class support for their cause. In many ways, the resort to violence against the symbols of consumption by the terrorists of the seventies was a return to the tactics of the generation that preceded theirs – though, of course, they conceived of themselves as fighting for the exact opposite cause, and their appeals were no longer linked with anti-Semitism. When members of the RAF later turned to bombs instead of fire, they had effectively broken with the society, no longer intent on warning or transforming, but rather with the single goal of destruction in mind.

The state responded to its perceived threat in a way that eventually made real the worst Orwellian nightmare the RAF could have imagined. In building a massive police apparatus to monitor “enemies of the state,” the West German state paralleled East Germany at the time. It also carried forth the logic of dual organization, from a concentration on Abgrenzung and the enemy without to a focus on the enemy within. This period in the seventies thus marks a turning point in the strategies of the Federal Republic. In the mid sixties, the state began substituting a Realpolitik and desentimentalization for its former strategy of restoration, policies that affected practices first in the seventies. The state pursued a Janus-faced strategy of progressive domestic reforms aimed at assimilating Generation II along with a closing of the ranks involving a redeﬁnition of the Other. For a mirror-image and public enemy number one, the West German state no longer looked primarily to the GDR (which it had by then “defeated” economically), but to its own radical youth. With this new alter-ego in mind, the state marshaled its resources and expanded its arsenals, all in the name of Verfassungsschutz, protecting the constitution.

What was nearly unanimously perceived by West Berliners of Generation II as the first direct assault on them as a group was the ordinance “Principles to the Question concerning Enemies of the Constitution in the Public Service,” passed on January 28, 1972, under the leadership of Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt. Commonly known as the Radikalenerlaß (decree about radicals), the decree was actually a Berufsverbot, black list, to prevent those in the student movement who were politically engaged (on the “wrong” side) from entering into public service. Because of this decree, up to 1982, according to ofﬁcial statistics, the government investigated over 1.4 million applicants for public service. In 25,000 cases, authorities already had information about the applicants; in 16,000 cases, the information was forwarded to the potential employer. In minimally 1,102 cases, the information caused a rejection of the applicant (Chaussy 1985: 55). Given the large number of jobs connected with the public sector, members of Generation II, even when not personally affected by the Radikalenerlaß, took offense at this ordinance as an example of institutionalized mistrust of them by the state.

As the West German state became increasingly apprehensive about its radical youth, it increased appropriations and positions for criminal police. In 1969, the BKA, Federal Ministry of Crime, had a budget of 24.8 million D-Marks, with 934 civil servants. By 1970 the budget was 36.8 million D-Marks; by 1971: 54.8 million D-Marks; by 1981: 290 million D-Marks. Furthermore, the number of positions appropriated to the BKA doubled between 1969 and 1971, with another 70 percent increase between 1971 and 1981 (see Aust 1989: 155; Katzenstein 1990; CILIP 1981).

By 1981, the BKA had even filled more positions than had been ofﬁcially appointed to it. This is all the more remarkable in that, by the end of 1974, the RAF existed only in prison. Even though all RAF members had already been arrested, the state continued arming for the battle. And the battle, indeed, presented itself: a whole new group without personal contacts to the ﬁrst RAF paralleled and followed the growth of the Federal Ministry of Crime. In 1977, the state and terrorists had reached a total impasse in negotiations about releasing hostages (held by the terrorists) for prisoners (held by the state). The Federal Republic, under the leadership of Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, decided to sacriﬁce the well-known industrialist (also former Nazi), Hans-Martin Schleyer, rather than negotiate with the new group of terrorists who had kidnapped him.

What were the terrorists actually demanding? While in prison in 1975, Ulrike Meinhof formulated the goal of the RAF as follows: “Terrorism is the destruction of life support systems, of dikes, wells, hospitals, energy plants. Everything that the American bombing attacks systematically targeted in their ﬁght against North Vietnam since 1965. Terrorism operates because of fear by the masses. The City Guerillas, contrariwise, carry this fear into the Apparatus.” These goals found widespread sympathy among her peers. In 1977, Federal Minister of the Interior Maihofer, using different terminology, nonetheless explicitly clariﬁed the civil war or inner-familiar nature of the conﬂict with the RAF: “There are no capitalists – now don’t be shocked by what I am about to say – who do not have terrorists among their closest relatives or
friends” (cited in Aust 1989: 350, 453). And by this, Maihofer did not mean kin in the GDR. People were to look at their own domestic group within the FRG and identify the enemy.

The battle to eliminate the RAF quickly took on a tragic quality whose meaning transcended the people directly involved. Ironically, both the state and members of the RAF pictured themselves as tragic heroes struggling against extraordinary odds to save society; and, from the perspective of each, they were both right. What the RAF perceived as a Totentanz came to signify, for Generations I and II, a generational conflict and control over die Vergangenheit, identified by Generation II as the state and society that had incorporated Nazi functionaires into its privileged structures. Social Democratic leaders of the government defended their fight against terrorism as necessary to protect the constitution, legitimating this struggle in the name of the office, employing the police force established for this job. Yet it had been clear since the early fifties that enemies of the constitution were nearly always defined as those on the left and not on the right. Not only the Baader-Meinhof group but also the whole generation of which they were a part shared a paranoia and fear of constantly being overwatched by the police. And the state reproduced this paranoia with regard to its fears of Generation II. Neither group lacked evidence for its thesis. Some of the early bombs used by the RAF were constructed by secret agents working for the Verfassungsschutz, the Office of Constitutional Protection; prison conversations between members of the RAF and their lawyers were bugged (in violation of the constitution) by police working for the Verfassungsschutz; and the RAF had, after all, explicitly stated its intention to destroy the state.

Despite disagreement with many of their methods and tactics, members of Generation II initially had great sympathy for some of the goals of the RAF, defined in many circles as a “war against a neo-fascist state.” When the so-called “Baader-Meinhof Gang” went underground in the late sixties/early seventies, they had enough sympathizers throughout the FRG to give them refuge despite not knowing them personally and despite misgivings about the methods they employed. One man testified after he’d been arrested for giving members of the RAF refuge: “Basically, I did it because I’m good natured. In any case, people who are chased by the police are still closer to me than are the cops.” An early member who was also imprisoned, the lawyer Horst Mahler, explained the conflict in terms of class interests: “Class conflict is not a civil servant career with expectations of a pension at the end” (cited in Aust 1989: 142, 223). He disagreed personally with some of the goals of the RAF, but still used the same language as they did, rejecting the lifecourse of Generation I as a particular bourgeois version of everyday life. The roots of the movement can be seen in causes identical to those of the Halbstarken – a reaction to the normalization techniques of the West German state – though its followers were better educated and more consciously political.

The period from 1968 to approximately 1981, then, an extremely formative one for the identity of Generation II, was full of paradox and reversals. By 1972, the Vietnam War had ended and the Social Democrats proposed a thorough education reform. By 1977, the state had enacted major, radical reforms in education and kinship law. The demands for cultural reform of the generational movement had successfully fused with political ones and provoked a change in the discourse of the state. The reaction of the state, however, was twofold: on the one hand it incorporated as many members of Generation II as possible into the various institutions, including into government as Beamte (as civil servants), and on the other hand it excluded those members too radical and threatening – or not assimilated enough in their Germaness – for the state.

The emergence of a new group of radicals in the mid seventies who used violent tactics – including murder, hijacking airplanes, and kidnapping of civilians – caught the Federal Republic by surprise. The initial RAF had, in fact, rejected such tactics for itself. Seven years after publication of Konzept Stadtguerilla by the RAF, where they described their goal as “to destroy the myth of the everydayness of the system and its invulnerability” (Aust 1989: 581), they had ironically succeeded. But in the meantime, the apparatus of constitutional protection had become larger and more grotesque than its opponents’ fantasies. New repressive laws allowing suspension of civil liberties, armed courtrooms, new security prisons, massive increases in money for and number of police and internal security agents, and random citizen controls, had by the late seventies become part of the everyday. This turn to force and construction of a huge apparatus was, moreover, more a sign of the state’s vulnerability than its strength.

During this period, members of Generation II, nearly without exception, experienced domestic and political life as fused; a large group even came to an understanding of how the two were linked. Not only did political conflicts reach into the domestic sphere in the form of political fights with their parents, but domestic conflicts quickly became
A squatters' movement and extra-parliamentary movement (APO) grew out of this new understanding.

**Squatters and the Alternative Liste**

The squatters' movement in West Berlin began near the end of 1979, concentrated in the Kreuzberg district. In the sixties, partly because of links between realty interests and politicians and because of a planned freeway through Kreuzberg, housing policy, especially in this district, focused on the demolition of old apartment buildings, resulting in the destruction of the integrity of residential neighborhoods. At the same time, the demography of Berlin, and in particular of Kreuzberg, was changing quickly, as many middle-class residents moved to other sections of the city (if not to West Germany) and many foreign Gastarbeiter moved in. By 1980, approximately half of all Kreuzberg residents under eighteen were Turkish; 27 percent of the total number of Kreuzberg residents were non-German. (In 1987, the number of non-Germans in West Berlin as a whole totaled 11.1 percent.) “Section 36” (SO 36), became famous for its “Kreuzberger Mischung,” a mixed community of Turks, the elderly, and the Left Szene people – unique for a German city.

The first squatted building was the Bethanien Hospital, a large complex forming an architectural unity that had survived the war relatively undamaged. Now displayed as an architectural icon attesting to the political effectiveness of squatters’ movements, Bethanien had been scheduled to be torn down. After citizen appeals to housing authorities failed to bring about a reconsideration of policy, people just moved in and squatted. The movement spread quickly, increasing the number of occupied buildings between 1980 and 1981 from 18 to 150. Lack of adequate housing, along with environmental and peace issues, brought together a coalition of groups that found themselves not represented by political parties already sitting in parliament. The movement was consciously APO, outside-of-parliament organization, and it led in 1979 to the founding of the Alternative Liste (AL) in West Berlin (later to ally with the West German Green Party). In May 1981, the AL won over 5 percent of the Berlin vote, thus achieving the right to representation in the Berlin Senat and the West German and European parliaments.

By 1980, approximately 1,000 buildings, containing anywhere from 12,000 to 20,000 apartments, were owned by real-estate speculators who left them either empty or partly empty. At its height, the squatters numbered from 2,000 to 3,000 people and occupied 150 buildings, though the movement included enough sympathizers to total 10,000 to 15,000 at each demonstration or police confrontation. From the start, the movement was considered an affront to private property laws and opposed by civil authorities and the police. Given the 22,000-strong Berlin police force, with approximately 15,000 involved in daily patrols, the numbers of police were nearly double those of squatters and their sympathizers. In the Szene the police were referred to as Bulle im Kampfanzug, cop/bull in fighting suit, or as “civilian in the costume of his scene.”

Increased confrontations and forced evictions of squatters by the police escalated the conflict. An encounter on December 12, 1980, for example, a demonstration on Kurfürstendamm in the center of West Berlin, resulted in 36 arrests and 200 wounded. Confrontations over the next several days resulted in an additional 73 arrests. Security experts, local politicians, and the press continuously speculated about the “terrorist orientation” of the squatters. Many people I talked with who had not sympathized with terrorist goals in the seventies suddenly found themselves lumped in this same category merely for engaging in legal civil protest to fight a wasteful and inept housing policy. Subsidies to buy houses in West Berlin had coaxed many West German businessmen to do just that – but only as tax refuges. They would then slowly evict all the tenants, and leave the building empty. Such buildings were more profitable as tax write-offs than as rentals, and the subsidies permitted speculators to wait for the day when rent controls would be lifted. Rent controls in Berlin in the late eighties were slowly being lifted, and many speculators held empty but usable buildings waiting for the moment when controls would be lifted. I met two such speculators myself, who admitted privately that it was not difficult to manipulate the regulations as long as one had no tenants. By 1984, the local Christian Democratic government policy toward the squatters in publicly owned buildings granted long-term leases or often sold buildings to the occupants, encouraging them to assume part of the renovation costs. (All statistics taken from CILIP 9/10, 1981: 2-5, 25-47, 72-86.)

The AL grew directly out of this confrontation, but was continually accused by the media of having created the Krawalle, demos and confrontation. Rather than raising suspicions about the goals of the AL, this accusation actually increased the support of Generation II for their political actions by confirming their opposition to official culture and the state. The description of the AL as an incoherent political-interest group also helped to constitute it in the minds of Germans. It became a
coherent extra-parliamentary political party, representing itself as a coalition of disparate, heterogeneous interests and practices, primarily environmental and humanistic, many of which were specific to Generation II. In the January 1989 election, they achieved 12 percent of the total vote and entered into a coalition with the Social Democratic Party to rule West Berlin, effectively changing their political status from outsider to insider.

Sexuality and partnership
The meaning of the politicized household growing out of the '68 Movement is now being openly disputed in a well-publicized media debate by participants and other interested parties alike. Its presumed consequences and results, intended and inadvertent successes and failures, were integral to the identity of Generation II, making up the categories (in various configurations) of their narrative of belonging. Their Germanness was quite differently constructed from that of their parents, organized around other sets of experiences and lifecourse transformations. In particular, marriage and the Hausfrauenehe, both state-sanctioned institutions, lost their centrality in structuring the lifecourse of Generation I in West Berlin, being replaced largely by a new meaning cluster shaped by the centrality of sexuality, partnerships, and free time. To explain how this new meaning cluster took shape is the purpose of this section.

The media debate about the meaning of the sixties, which began during the very time that the sixties were being created, forced Generation II to be hyper-articulate about their practices, often to justify what they thought they were doing before they actually did anything. Additionally, the changed political-economic situation of the early and mid 1980s (e.g., a conservative Christian Democrat/Free Democrat government, rising unemployment, and a worsening economy for some) forced members of Generation II into a defensive position, shortening the time-lag between doing and reevaluating the past.

Disaggregating kinship
In their reconstructions, most West Berlin members of Generation II made it clear that they have tried to disaggregate kinship: that means to distinguish being in a partnership from both being a married partner and being a specific type of legal object for state policy. We can better clarify the distinctions they made if we apply Foucault's three analytical techniques discussed in chapter 1. Members of Generation II delineated (1) relationship aspects of partnership (communication techniques such as being in a Zweierbeziehung, an exclusive two some, or a Beziehungskiste, a boxed-in, problematic relationship, or simply having a Freundin, with whom one may or not be involved sexually) from (2) the self-aspects (self-techniques such as playing the role of "husband" and "wife"), and from (3) being objects defined by the state (signification techniques used by the state to define the subject, such as married, divorced, widowed, single). By disaggregating this complex of meanings defining partnership, all tied centrally to the institution of marriage, members of Generation II opened up the space for new practices, with new significations, and ultimately new selves.

Let me offer an example. Hans-Peter, in his conversations with me, distinguished between his Freundin, whom he visited several times a week, his Frau, with whom he had lived for ten years, and his status as a single man, ledig or single. He delineated being a partner from what it meant for his definition of personhood, thus denying the state a direct role in defining his relationship and making him a particular object of policy. I am arguing here only that most of Hans-Peter's peers made distinctions between sets of practices (which can be isolated into different analytical techniques), and not that they made the same distinctions. Rather, the distinctions they made grew out of their model self, which, I have been arguing, saw itself in opposition to their parents, to the past, and to the state. To the extent they defined themselves positively, it was based on an agreement about the heterogeneity of practices, experimentation, and a discontinuous lifecourse.

Having already examined the fluidity of household patterns and their politicization in the socio-economic context of the last twenty-five years, we can now discuss partnership and childcare, two essential aspects of kinship. Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that partners did not always live together, and that those who did live together were not always cohabiting. Partnership, household, and cohabitation were often not coterminous. For example, that 52 percent of all West Berlin households were defined as "singles" reflected only on marital status; it did not address coupling patterns. Many singles lived with others, in fact, but maintained their own, second household; it is unlikely that most were celibate. For members of Generation II in West Berlin, not only had the range of possible partnership patterns increased, but so had the social legitimacy (and in some respects legal legitimacy) of practicing this range. Increased legitimacy opened up space for individuals to
change the form and meaning of their partnership patterns, not only in contrast to their elders but also with respect to their own pasts. A single lifecourse could, then, follow several careers, reverse trajectories, and assume discontinuous patterns. This "discontinuous lifecourse" was, in fact, a characteristic that demarcated Generation II in West Berlin from its predecessors and, more than likely, will demarcate them from the next generation.

Berlin's postmodernism

The increased spectrum of possibilities did not appear spontaneously, however. Certain individuals, and the WG as a household form, in particular, were instrumental in creating alternative, experimental models that opened up the range of partnership and childcare patterns. The practice of these alternatives, which prior to 1968 were subversive significations, became conventionalized in a mere twenty years. Die Szene in Berlin and alternative lifestyles were now as essential to the topography of West Berlin as was KaDeWe, the Kaufhaus des Westens, the Wall, and World War II widows. Tourist brochures from the Berliner Senat metonymously incorporated the Szene, along with historical buildings, the Wall, East Berlin, the Turks, KuDamm, and the visit of John F. Kennedy in 1962, as part of the essential Berlin (what one must see and know). What in the early sixties had been heresy, a "nuisance" that Chancellor Erhard would "do everything I can to destroy," was now part of the permanent, official display of West Berlin.

In official pictures of Berlin, the city was represented not in terms of a set of model or typical things but as the range of its objects. Even the ruling Christian Democrats of the early eighties sought to represent Berlin in postmodern colors: as heterogeneous and polysemic. This new state strategy dates to former Christian Democrat Richard von Weiźacker, who was mayor from 1981 to 1984, and tended to emphasize hierarchical incorporation over assimilation and exclusion. It characterized policy in the eighties generally, and was applied more fully in West Berlin and the province Baden-Württemberg than elsewhere in the Federal Republic.

This new metonymy of late-capitalist West Berlin, partly a marketing strategy to prevent it from losing its status as a metropolis, originated in contests around definitions of sexuality in the mid sixties, specifically in challenges to the hegemony of the Hausfrauenhe model, to which we must now briefly return. If we remember our analysis of West German policy, the model of the housewife marriage, while not literally written into the Basic Law of 1949, was nonetheless read into it as the center of kin policy in the fifties. By focusing state policies and legal discourse around a procreative, productivist model, the Ministry of the Family, along with other social institutions, sought to construct a habitus with a narrow range of family forms, and thus standardize the production of married couples who would reproduce. These couples were best stabilized if tied to a specific model of capitalist property ownership: the single family home. Generation I did not often practice this kinship configuration, and the state was never able to realize this model in all its policies (least of all in Berlin, where Social Democrats at times propagated oppositional policies). Yet until the late sixties resistance to it remained private and certainly was rarely articulated as a challenge in the domain of sexuality.

Transformations in sexuality and gender

A general liberalization of sex practices began in the late sixties, but did not become part of mass youth culture (and then initially only of students) until the early seventies. As late as 1966, one survey revealed that 66 percent of all female students were virgins. "To sleep together was taboo," wrote Ingrid Schmidt-Harzbach, who was born in 1941. "Petting was the magic word then, and for that there were also unwritten rules - down to the bellybutton, then you had to quit, then began 'Forbidden Territory,' as we called it . . . Faithfulness and such things also played an important role" (1985: 39). During the sixties, most young people still lived with their parents, who forbade any sex before marriage; those who studied away from the parental home normally encountered housemasters who demanded a clause in the rent contract forbidding visits by the opposite sex. Even though the pill was by then legal, unmarried women reported that they had no alternative but to go to a doctor known for treating prostitutes, who, one woman told me, "handled us accordingly."

Yet, even as social authorities tried to restrict the sexual practices of Generation II, to hold what people heralded as the "sexual revolution" in check, a sex wave hit the press, especially the right-wing, conservative tabloids. Popular illustrated magazines such as Bild and Stern began at this time to show nude women on their covers. A specific capitalist form of pornography-based sexuality, based on the public sale of women's sexual services, quickly established itself in the middle and upper-middle classes of large cities, epitomized in the ubiquitous "Sex
Shop" to be found in every business or non-residential area of West Berlin. In other words, for certain kinds of sexual practices, the market principle established itself, exploiting unfulfilled heterosexual desires already there and creating new desires that could be satisfied without threatening marriage and other institutions basic to the sexual and political order. Meanwhile, the liberalized practice of sexual expression—e.g., sex between unmarrieds and homosexual practices—remained socially taboo, although over time, as housing became less crowded and legal penalties went unenforced, there were fewer negative sanctions that could be brought to bear on such practices. Under the general label "homosexuality," a number of practices remained illegal until 1972, and thereafter legal only for consenting adults practicing them in certain spaces (depending on a number of factors having nothing to do with homosexuality per se, such as, e.g., the biological age or social class of sodomy or fellatio partners, the time of day in which the sex was practiced—public spaces after dark preferable to any space in daylight, and the nature of the public facility).

By the late sixties, the demands of those in the movement, according to one of the participants, the writer and sex theorist Ulrike Heider, included sexual equality, the overcoming of bourgeois (double) morality, and the right to refuse to marry and found a family (1989:129–130). Note the trajectory of these demands: from the specifics of sexual practices, to domestic life more generally, to the legal and political. Whereas some writers argue in the press today that women in the '68 Movement were sexually oppressed and repressed, other women in their reconstructions remembered it differently. Heider sides with the latter group, recalling that women shared their sex experiences with each other and prized men who showed affection and sensitivity. Women, writes Heider, were neither primarily operating under an Orgasmuszwang, compulsion to have orgasm, nor required "to be sexually available" to all men, although there were, of course, those types of men and women also (1989:129–130).

Raising all this to a conscious level and creating a discourse concerning the range of possibilities regarding coupling and sexuality, a task many members of Generation II took to be their mission, changed the nature of practices, both continuously generating new practices and increasing the pressure within small groups to conform to the latest rage. An Alternative avant-garde growing out of the Szene and the student movement became the vanguard for the movement. The situation was quite unlike that in East Berlin, where, for example, the Kumpel relationship, with its origins in working-class, male behavior, was slowly appropriated by both sexes in other classes. Since few students in West Berlin/FRG came from working-class families, working-class culture played a minimal role in producing behavioral models for partnership or sexual behavior in West Berlin. Male students often had their first sexual experience with working-class girls, since it was well known that working-class boys and girls had sex earlier than the German bourgeoisie. But until the early seventies, sex remained taboo for most female students, in accord with the behavioral mores of their social class. The models for the West Germans of Generation II came from the Adel, upper-bourgeois culture, and from America, neither of which sought to challenge dominant norms.7

Feminist challenges to gender significations also contributed to transforming both the overall significance of sexuality and the way it is practiced. Mostly students from white-collar families who obtained access to higher education following university reforms after "1968," these women reacted to the bourgeois model of the proper. Bourgeois families differed most from working-class families in that working-class women always labored as much as the men, whereas in the adapted Adel model, taken from German nobility, a cultivated housewife and mother was prized. Working against this bourgeois tradition, avoiding any association with GDR initiatives having to do with the reorganization of labor (East Germans were dismissed generally as inferior and politically backward), West German feminists in the early seventies challenged the significations of gender, reproduction, and sexuality.

Although women of Generation I experienced most directly the elevation of Hausfrauenehe to a social norm in the fifties and sixties, their daughters of Generation II first brought this model into consciousness, politicizing it as a socially imposed male institution. This reaction introduced a quite different dynamic for men and women of Generation II regarding the practice of sexuality and gender. If women defined their own sexual identities in opposition to a gender signification, to being male ("patriarchal" was the word most often employed), men defined their sexual identities in opposition to the sexual practices of the generation that preceded them. In other words, women sought to resignify gender; men sought to resignify sexuality. Admittedly, changing one signification would influence the other, but the point is that women and men moved out of different assumptions about what was central. This difference in approach explains many of the subsequent conflicts and antagonisms between women and men of Generation II in their political agendas.
Early feminists objected to the way in which capitalist market mechanisms, which they associated with the *Wirtschaftswunder*, had fetishized them as heterosexual sexual objects for the purpose of selling goods, ranging from cigarettes to cars, and of course, selling themselves. This was, they maintained, a system for the benefit of men, including also their male partners. The fact that German men, even those in the movement, rarely took this critique seriously increased tension between the sexes. On the other hand, men of Generation II concentrated their own critique on sexual repression *per se*, their goal being to liberate desire and the possibilities for its practice generally (by which they usually meant heterosexual desire and practice), and not to resignify the gender system that constructed this desire in a particular way.

Many women reacted to the ideological configuration inherited from the Adenauer and Erhard era by rejecting sexually encoded partnerships with men. This model, we remember, situated the housewife at home in a heterosexual marriage and gave her a marginal position in the labor force. Feminists in West Berlin reconstructed a series of campaigns that, while never fully participated in by a majority of women, nonetheless referenced points alluded to by nonparticipants also. These campaigns highlighted the tensions surrounding contested sexual meanings in nearly all relationships of the mid to late seventies. The campaign against the *Schwanzfick* (literally, fucking-with-the-cock) encouraged women to have sex with men only on the condition that there be no penetration of the vagina. In the late seventies, a popular slogan was, “Feminism is the theory, lesbian is the practice.” By the early eighties, this had been parodied by some women, who coined the term *Berufslesben*, occupational lesbians, to refer to their friends who did not limit the practice of homosexuality to sexual life, but radically extended it into an entire lifestyle that avoided all contact with males. One of the major influences or legacies of these “movements” was that the number of women of Generation II who experienced forms of love and sex with other women, or at least those who spoke about and affirmed such experiences, far outnumbered their counterparts in East Berlin, and most certainly it was an experience few of their mothers had. This sensitized them to issues relating to their identity as women, creating a specific (and larger) set of shared lifecourse transformations that made their generational unity gender-specific.

Because of the way in which this identity had been constructed – opposed to the masculine gender and opposed to the state apparatus aimed at restoration of patriarchy – West Berlin women differed considerably from their East German counterparts, who did not face the same kinds of male- or state-constructed obstacles, and thus did not see themselves in such stark opposition to males. Additionally, the continuity between generations was stronger in the East. While East German women of Generation II could draw on the positive accomplishments of their mothers in establishing an autonomous identity outside the home, West German women were often required to break with their mothers and forge a new way. Only with the student movement in 1968 did women begin developing a positive attitude toward work and public life, overcoming myths such as that of the wicked working mother and the *Schlüsselkind* – the mother whose child must wear a key around his/her neck to open the house door upon returning home, for mother is at work. And not until the eighties did a majority of West German women begin thinking in terms of “their own life” and not “being there for others” (Sommerkorn 1988: 136).

Men of Generation II did not articulate as coherent a narrative concerning sexual practices in their relation to partnerships as did their women counterparts. Largely, this was because so many aspects of gender and sexuality were taken for granted by men, assumed to be “natural” and therefore not questioned. Unlike in East Germany, where certain working-class-based models had been appropriated in wider circles of public life, in West Berlin sexuality and gender patterns remained more class-specific.

Men in the traditional working class of West Berlin, much like their East Berlin counterparts, tended to avoid discussions of sexual identity. In their life reconstructions, men of the middle and upper classes tended to begin with declarations of whether they were homo or hetero, in other words, they identified a sexual object choice as either male or female, and then out of this choice deduced a sexual identity. Often the first sexual experience had little to do with current sexual identity, since first experiences, for both men and women of Generation II, were often with older male family members or neighbors. Not until the sixties did most youths have their own bedrooms. It was not uncommon that young boys who slept with older siblings or relatives would often be introduced to sexual activity by them. Many men told me such stories, portraying them as sexual adventures. Women who told me of sexual experiences with relatives tended to reconstruct them as experiences of rape.

The experiences of men in all social classes exhibited a much broader range of practices than did their self-definitions (or silences). Men who
identified themselves as heterosexual tended to exile experiences that contradicted this concept of self to the distant past. Those who had lived in communes or WGs often reported nostalgically about the “free-sex” days, of the ability to change partners and partnership form fairly easily, and of having had some group sex experience. The several men and women still living in large WGs or communes whom I befriended, all of whom identify themselves as heterosexual, claimed that they no longer partook in sexual experimentation. Most had steady partners with whom they had sex; few of them tended to live with their partners.

Since the early seventies, the Schwulenszene, gay scene, in Berlin again achieved something of the notoriety it enjoyed in the twenties, and gay men from all over Germany (as well as from the United States and other European countries) tended to gather in West Berlin because of its tolerant atmosphere, as well as, of course, to escape military service. It was centered around bars, discos, and cafés, had its own museum, monthly magazine, and political organizations, and since the advent of AIDS education campaigns by the Federal Ministry of Health and the Family, achieved a kind of unity it hasn’t had since before the war. Gay organizations were well integrated into the Alternative Liste – several of whose delegates were gay or lesbian – so that gay culture in Berlin was incorporated into alternative-oriented groups and thus formed an integral part of Generation II. Because of the many political or social integrative mechanisms in West Berlin, gays were not as autonomously organized as in e.g., England, France, or the United States.

As the gay and lesbian movements grew, they changed the lifecourse trajectories not only of the men or women who took on such identities, but also of others in West Berlin who frequented their bars and clubs. “Mixed” places, as they were called, where homos and heteros mixed, were now often places where sex and sexual identity played a secondary role to aspects of self-allegorization such as rejection of normality, experimentation, and leftist political orientation – dimensions central to the Germanness of Generation II. Men who frequented these places exhibited an extremely wide range of behaviors that, while signifying sexuality and gender, generally, were quite ambiguous in what they specifically expressed. Purely hetero bars and discos, some specializing in the singles scene, were also quite common in Berlin, but these tended to be more strictly class-segregated than the mixed or homo bars. In four visits to working-class hetero bars in Wedding, I noticed remarkable uniformity of clothing and style, and heard mostly Berliner dialect.

In many visits to middle- or upper-class hetero bars, I heard many more dialects, indicating that most of the people came from parts of Germany outside of Berlin, and I observed a wide range of fashion and etiquette.

This excursion into sexual meanings cannot do justice to the intricacies of practices, movements, and identities, for they fit no neat typology, and their range was greater than I am capable of describing here. Nonetheless, this discussion indicates how a cluster of meanings appropriated by Generation I, radically organized around the Hausfrauenehe, was displaced by one organized around sexualities and gender. This sexuality- and gender-centered identity displaced the meaning of having children, when that was at all part of the lifecourse for members of Generation II, by placing childbirth and childcare in a new meaning cluster, attached not to status accrued from marriage but to free time and work. Let us lastly examine that particular reconfiguration and its significance for the lifecourse transformations of Generation II.

**Children, work, free time, and friends**

Germanness for Generation II was a set of lifecourse transformations that took them through a number of social movements, generally directed against sources of traditional authority (their parents and the state), to a point, in the late eighties, where they had largely been incorporated into the structures of everyday life (highly subsidized and often choreographed by the state) that characterized West Berlin. At the time of my study, members of this group were anywhere between the ages of thirty-three and forty-eight, and had already settled into patterns of work, relationships, and time allocation unlikely to change radically for the rest of their lives. In this section, I would like to focus on the meaning of childcare and free time, and explain how these two activities have come to structure the space formerly occupied by marriage for the generation of their parents.

**Why marry?**

Changes in the interrelation of domesticity and politics, including new forms of households, partnerships, gender significations, and political participation, radically decentered the legal institution of marriage for Generation II. Niklas Luhmann (1982) has noted that sometime during the seventies marriage lost its monopoly on fulfilling emotional needs. This loss of centrality was largely due to the gradual conventionalization of alternate forms of Lebensgemeinschaften, living-together arrangements, and childcare patterns. Changes in household structure coincided with a changing understanding of marriage.
with the appearance of new partnership forms, which, in turn, created a new context for posing the question, “why marry?”

Unlike in East Berlin, where women and men tended to marry primarily for partnership considerations, marriages among West German women were intimately linked with the expectation or wish for children. This did not mean that all West Berlin women who had children married (21 percent did not), but simply that, of those who did marry, the most common reason was that they were having a child. Rosemarie Nave-Hertz calls this phenomenon “child-centered marital grounds” (1988: 67). The question that follows is why women who expected to become mothers decided also to become wives.

In many conversations, women confirmed to me that they either married or stayed married when (or after) they had children, because they realized their standard of living would fall drastically should their male partners leave them. Despite many subsidies by the West German state to mothers, the absence of a second income made raising a child extremely difficult. Single mothers reported feeling socially marginalized and being unable to participate in public life. Baby-sitters were quite expensive, and taking children into the public sphere, something accepted in certain circles in East Berlin, was frowned upon in West Berlin. Married women said that being a mother and wife was better than just being a mother, because they were financially better off than they would have been as single mothers.

It is quite seductive to draw a causal link between legal incentives for marriage and the differing personal motivations in East and West Berlin. The major motivation for marriage in the East was legitimation of partnership, which also happened to be the official strategy of the legal institution; in the West it was the legitimation of children, which also corresponded to the strategy of the law there. But a causal inference, that the intent of marital law was read into, and thus caused its (proper) reception, would be an oversimplification. Many social processes, not the law alone, were involved in supporting or severing the link between coupling (through marriage) and having children. We will discuss these below.

My own ethnographic data in West Berlin indicates that pregnant women married not to legitimate the relationship of child to father, as the law intended, but to secure the status of mother within the set of social and state-defined supports and incentives tied to being a “married woman.” In other words, marriage in West Germany strengthened the state–society support system for the signification “wife/mother.” It made it difficult for a woman to be a mother without also performing the role of a wife. A mother in West Berlin, I was often told, had few recourse to state support and suffered from social isolation if she had no husband—a pattern that did not hold true to the same degree for a single mother in East Berlin. Hence the best security in raising a child for a West Berlin woman was to have herself defined as married. The relationship with the partner was rather secondary to being in a marital state that legitimated the parental relationship to the child, and bestowed it with statuses, financial rewards, and social opportunities not available to a single parent.

This discussion has focused on why women married, which still leaves us with the question of why men did. When I asked men this question directly, they usually answered, “for love.” Yet, from their reconstructions, I know that some preferred not to marry, and did so only after being pressured by their partner. Many men admitted that the decision to marry rested more on their girlfriend’s wishes than their own. For men of Generation II, “being married” or “having a wife” did not carry the same social status as it did for their fathers. If anything, marriage had a negative connotation, of being spießig and of asking the state for legitimation of a personal relationship. They would have preferred to keep the state out of their lives. (In fact, the number of men opting out of marriage was greater than the number of women who did so, while the total number of marriages had also consistently declined since 1964.) Hence, among my acquaintances who were married, most would have preferred to remain unmarried, but in a more-or-less permanent partnership. Having a child, according to these men, was a mutual decision, although ultimately they felt they were dependent on the wishes of their partner.

Parenting and partners
As marital partnerships became more child-centered, they lost a great deal of their emotional intensity, even to the point of no longer having much independent meaning. Parents now reported having little time for each other, and children tended to see parents separately and not with each other together. Parents proclaimed that they wanted to raise their child to be self reliant, but they rarely left the child unattended and alone (Schütze 1988: 111). The emotional dependence between parents and children had therefore increased over time, and it went both ways: as a major 1985 study concludes, “[Children function] as ersatz partners and parents cannot break away from their oldest
The contemporary parent-child relationship was now more idiosyncratically styled and negotiable than in former times. Members of Generation II as parents sought to eliminate the authority aspects of their role; hence they often did not teach their children to address them by the titles "mother" and "father." It was now convention to have their children address them by their own personal names and not by the generic name for the role. Since partnership could be practiced outside of marriage, marriage was increasingly reduced to legitimating this procreative relationship, again increasing pressure for meaning on the parent-child relation to hold together the couple.

Having a baby reduced free time and shrank the circle of friends. Many parents moved to the place in West Berlin considered outside the center or outside the Szene, in districts such as Wedding or Reinickendorf, where the rent was cheaper and there were more "green spaces," considered an important part of a child's environment. This movement out of the center made it more difficult for friends to gather, hence further isolating couples with children. Researchers have noted a general trend in the Federal Republic (I assume this holds true for both Berlins and East Germany also) for the nuclear-family type to unite at the home around television (Lukesch 1988: 173–197), and to restrict their familial network to blood relatives; in one study, half of those interviewed had no friends at all (Lüschen 1988: 145–172). Because of the transient nature of much of the Berlin community, as noted in chapter 4, the option of a family larger than the nuclear unit comprised of only blood relatives did not even exist for many young parents. This lack of blood kin "forced" West Berliners to experiment more with the definition of family, and it was my impression that they practiced a far greater range of kin and childcare patterns not defined by affinal or consanguinal ties than did people in the Federal Republic.

The children's role was changing. The child, no longer an object for the social climbing or security of the parents (as in the fifties), instead became extremely valuable as an emotional dependent. This meant that as a child aged, and perhaps became less dependent, it lost in value. Members of what will be Generation III were not expected to play a productive role as individuals in supporting aging parents, since the state's pension and elderly care system was extensive. The child was thus increasingly valued in and for itself, as a non-adult who consumed items rather than produced them. Children in the late eighties consumed more of parents' money and for a much longer period of time than did Generation II, and given the gloomier economic outlook for them compared to their parents, they were not expected to pay anything back. The most frequently used word in reconstructions to describe these children was satt, full or sated. Many members of Generation III even used it, albeit somewhat ironically, to describe themselves.

In the eighties, the role of father gained in prominence, and an increasing number of men saw fatherhood as a neglected aspect of their life course. This was due both to the large numbers of single and divorced mothers in West Berlin—still less than in the East—and also to the necessity for mothers to find others to help in childcare. Thus many women sought out fathers for their children. The lack of state support for working mothers, meaning lack of both monetary and institutional support, forced many West Berlin women to rely on husbands, ex-husbands, ex-lovers, and male and female friends to assist in parenting. For men, in turn, this meant that fatherhood was no longer always attached to being a husband. This trend was not true for men with either very high- or low-status jobs, who were, on the whole, socially discouraged or even penalized by their employers for making parenting a priority. Yet West Berlin, with its large and quite visible alternative scene, may have been the one West German city in which nonconventional forms of parenting were so widespread that the "normal" housewife/mother and working father/husband was more the exception than the rule.

Children were only part of the story of Generation II, and a declining part, as an increasing number of West Berlin women and men chose not to become mothers and fathers. From 1965 to 1980, the number of births per 1,000 women in the Federal Republic as a whole decreased from 17.7 to 10.1 (Nave-Herz 1988: 73). This decline is not attributable to an increase in abortions, as they were first legalized in 1979, well after the birth rate had declined. For an increasing number of women and men, the decision not to become a parent was a conscious and positive part of identity. East Berlin women, contrariwise, nearly unanimously included becoming a mother as an essential transformation of their life course; they did not view it as one among other alternative options. State policy was intimately related to these two identity constructs. In the East, the vigorously pronatal policy so strongly supported mothers that the state ended up encouraging motherhood to be regarded as one
essential component of personhood along with others, such as public employment and civic-mindedness. In the West, motherhood was also singled out by the state as a primordial role, but it existed in an ambivalent relation to other significations of personhood, such as public employment, status, and wealth. Most mothers of Generation II whom I knew claimed that motherhood and childcare involved a trade-off with other activities important to them, such as careers, political involvement, and relations with friends. Consequently, many women in West Berlin were opting against motherhood.

Childcare

By the end of the seventies, several formal aspects of childcare had restructured its content. First, playgrounds increased in number and decreased in size. Whereas in the early fifties, children in Berlin played in streets and old buildings without being watched by their parents, by the mid seventies the traffic was too heavy to leave children alone in the streets, and special children’s playgrounds had been built. Furthermore, the number of children in kindergartens increased from 40 to 80 percent between 1970 and 1980, meaning that within a ten-year period twice as many children entered public care units for at least part of the day. This institutional shift is significant in that the state began to share more of the burden of parenting, much as in the East, though for fewer people and fifteen to twenty years later. From the perspective of the child, s/he was being constantly supervised by an adult: at home, at daycare, and at play. The experience of anarchy so important to Generation II was totally lacking from the lives of their children.

A second formal aspect changing the nature of parenting was the modernization of apartments, with time-saving technical accoutrements, which has made it technically easier for parents to care for children. For example, for the FRG as a whole, from 1950 to 1982, the number of apartments doubled and the size increased from 57 to 82-95 square meters, and the number of apartments with toilets, bath, and central heating increased from 30 percent in 1965 to 66 percent in 1982 (Vaskovics 1988: 37). The advent of television as ersatz baby-sitter, as mentioned above, also somewhat alleviated parental-care responsibilities, while perhaps creating other problems to be encountered later.

In their reconstructions, many women complained that the lack of public childcare support systems forced mothers to withdraw from participation in public life. Their situation was, however, less dramatic in West Berlin than in other Bundesländer, because West Berlin had always been, by comparison, a model of support systems for children and mothers. For example, although only every fifth child in West Berlin attended the Kinderkrippen (preschools, from eight weeks to the end of the third year), West Berlin itself had half of all preschool enrollment of the entire FRG. The situation in West Berlin might not have been as extensive as in East Germany, but it was much better than in West Germany. Single mothers or fathers were the most seriously disadvantaged by this lack of public support. Nearly all children between the ages of three to six were enrolled in Kindergarten (because these were considered educational preparation). For working parents whose time schedule did not match that of the schools, there were the Horten for children ages six to nine, and 38 percent of all children participated in these. The total participation for children in Horten ages one to three was 28 percent, ages three to five was 69 percent, ages five to six was 52 percent (Familienbericht 1987: 36-39). In East Berlin, where many kinds of public support were readily available, people complained about the quality of their care; in West Berlin, they complained about the difficulty in obtaining care.

Free time and work

Finally, we should note changes in the relation of free time to work, and then relate this work/free time complex to children, especially as it pertained to women. We can show how this new meaning cluster influenced the redefinition of kin and friendship. Among members of Generation II with whom I spoke, the domain of work did not function as the central defining feature of identity. In this sense, they differed radically from their parents. This did not mean, however, that work was unimportant, but rather that the organization of free time was always juxtaposed to and given priority over work responsibilities.

Unlike their parents, members of Generation II had not experienced anxiety concerning employment, for most assumed positions during the greatest period of economic expansion, or they collected welfare benefits that did not lower their status or change their yearly routines substantially. Women of this generation had also done much better than their mothers, although their incorporation into the labor force still did not parallel that of women in the East. In terms of education, this generation had also done well. Still, proportionately fewer German women had qualifications appropriate to the higher administrative grades, meaning that fewer women percentage-wise occupied white-collar jobs in the public sector.
The government employed an increasingly large percentage of people in upper-level white-collar jobs. It was an impersonal employer, giving positions out on the basis of formal qualifications and not patronage or spoils. Only with the exception of political criteria used in the Radi-kalenerläß had the government stayed from this principle. The number of public employees lacking intermediate educational qualifications dropped from 43.8 percent to 26.3 percent, while those with such education increased from 5.7 percent to 11.1 percent, with most of the educated newcomers belonging to Generation II. Between 1950 and 1980, public (state) employment doubled, with the largest relative increase, 18 percent, from 1970 to 1975. By 1980, 50.6 percent of all primary incomes received by West Germans (largely pensioners and unemployed persons) came from the government, compared with 34.6 percent in 1960 (Schmidt and Rose 1985: 126–162).

Although work continued to play an important role in the lives of Generation II, it was now tied to the expectation of self-fulfillment (either pleasurable in and of itself or the means to procure pleasure). Nearly all members of Generation II whom I knew either expected fulfillment in their work, or they worked at jobs just to get by, vorübergehende Arbeit. They lacked the investment and commitment to work that characterized the postwar identity of their parents. If either the “jobs to get by” or their normal work (ordentliche Arbeit) for which they were trained: (mit Ausbildung) did not fulfill the individuals, they became faul (lazy, uncooperative) and performed their work functions demonstratively displaying extreme displeasure. Beamte, civil servants, were exemplars of this kind of behavior. It seemed as if they tried to humiliate and dominate customers when they were forced to serve them – which was, of course, their job. Since civil servants had for-life tenures, it was nearly impossible to fire them. Many members of Generation II who did not hold Beamte positions nonetheless took from them their behavioral model. The extreme autonomy needs of Generation II thus often translated into romanticized versions of work free of control or domination, or into self-realization as free time: freedom from work and institutional control.

The Urlaub was the paradigm of free time, as intimated in the section on Generation I in chapter 7. It became a nearly sacred affair for Generation II as adults. Over half of my acquaintances took at least two vacations a year. Even those who were unemployed still managed to organize their own birthday party and take at least one vacation to a sun spot. Anything less than a month was considered more a break than a vacation. Long trips were usually made with one or several friends, most of whom had known each other for a lengthy time. Married and unmarried couples with children tended to travel without friends. Married people without children, however, often took separate vacations, traveling with a friend or friends of the same sex.

Much as their parents, members of Generation II considered vacations a time for Erholung, relaxation and recovery from work. Vacations were the key event that periodized the year, divided it into a before and after, meaning before and after work. For Generation I, pleasure was often attached to nachholen, making up for time lost due to the war. This concept was no longer significant for Generation II, who sought instead self-fulfillment in pleasurable forms of Erholung. Really to recover from work meant to them, even more than for their parents, to travel to a foreign country, away from Germany and other Germans, preferably to a place in the sun. Many people tended to want to see the whole world rather than repeat vacations, to seek new adventures in places not yet explored. Planning the vacation was extremely important, and often began while on the present one. This pronounced value given to free time was, they felt, due reward for the high productivity of the West German worker within the present economic-political system, though this was a statistical artifact of the West German economy, rarely a reference to their own productivity.

This free-market framework, dubbed by the Christian Democrats in the fifties “the social-market economy,” allowed for groups with critical relations to the center to create their own cultural milieux, relatively unfettered by state ideology. Women in West Berlin reaped some unexpected benefits from their free space independent of state control, much as other less powerful groups did. Since the mid seventies, the establishment of women’s bars, cafés, and bookstores, serves as a unique testament to this generation of German women. Along with the expanded role for women in the Alternative Liste (which also contributed to an opening of political roles for women in the other political parties), these efforts enabled women to consolidate an autonomous identity both as women and as a specific generation of women. Even women who did not frequent these avant-garde institutions were affected by them, for they served to politicize issues normally thought of as domestic, and therefore often not acknowledged in public discourse. This relationship between women, at various times involving shared households, children, sex, or political actions, provided a counterbalance or alternative source of self-signification to the “mother”, “wife,”
and “worker” provided in the state’s account. In their reconstructions, even those women of Generation II not active in this institutionalized, gendered activity who continued to follow the lifecourse transformation of a “traditional” German woman and did not themselves utilize the larger repertoire of significations, identified with many of the goals of the women’s movement, and appropriated its language for their own purposes.

Men of Generation II, while certainly affected by the women’s movement, did not use it to categorize their life constructions. In fact, many men on both sides of the political spectrum spoke quite derisively of women, and felt that women’s attempts to attain autonomy had been at their expense. Fatherhood and childcare, as mentioned above, was considered a new male activity, and more men took an active part in childcare in West Berlin than in the East, though this activity was only rarely used to periodize the lifecourse. More important was the vacation and free-time activities. West Berlin offered an incredible panoply of forums in which one could enjoy free time and meet friends. Most free-time activities centered around going to the Kneipe or the Café, but many men also attended concerts, movies, plays, and other neighborhood cultural activities. Men mentioned forms of male bonding that had developed around activities and institutions such as living-together arrangements in WGs, vacationing together (or, for blue-collar workers, weekly sport groups) as peculiarities in their histories that made their lives unique.

Much like their fathers, these men figured their life story more centrally with reference to categories primarily drawn from politics and economic life; they simply used a different periodization, often drawn from social movements rather than official politics. The various movements of Generation II increased the range of possible lifecourse transformations for West Berlin men in ways that differed from the choices available to their East Berlin peers, and they politicized domestic life as well as mobilized men of Generation II for political activities, unlike their fathers.

Consumer goods did not play the same role as they did for their fathers in periodizing the lifecourse. Although automobiles played an equally central symbolic function, they were neither primarily extensions of family status nor vehicles for flight, but rather, served solely as private consumption items and forms of self or ego-assertion. Most men of this generation of my acquaintance defended quite vehemently the lack of a speed limit on the West German freeways, and drove fast and aggressively whenever given the chance, even though in other respects they were much more sensitive to others as well as more secure of themselves than their fathers.

Both men and women of Generation II tended to celebrate one ritual, their birthday, usually attended by people of one’s own generation, and narrowed to closest friends or would-be friends (meaning no Bekannte, acquaintance, or Verwandtschaft, relative, unless they were also friends). The ceremony attached to birthdays was somewhat frowned upon in the late sixties, but since the late seventies, birthdays again reestablished themselves as central ritual events. The person whose birthday it was must organize and pay for it. I found little variance in these activities by sex or class. All guests were expected to bring a gift, but little hoopla was made about them. Birthday celebrations were the one festival that I found nearly identical for Generation II in East and West Berlin. Given their personal significance to members of Generation II, along with the vacation, they should be taken seriously as rituals that both constituted and displayed categories of belonging. They brought together the important categories of free time, friends, and self-realization (hosted by oneself at one’s own convenience) that made up the Germanness of Generation II.

Conclusion
Members of Generation II were children of the German defeat and the politics of the Cold War. Reared by parents with limited means in an anarchic childhood, predisposed to rebellion against authorities severely undermined by the defeat in World War II, the majority of West Berliners of Generation II, nonetheless, reached adulthood as relatively assimilated and comfortable Germans. Much like their parents, they experienced a discontinuous lifecourse. But for them, this discontinuity was planned, a result not of imposed depression, war, and dictatorship, but of their own experimentation and striving for agency against the control instruments of social and state structures. However, this lifecourse obtained coherence not merely with reference to an internal social dynamic, but also as an integral part of a dual organization, constructed in contradistinction, as mirror-image, to the lifecourse in East Berlin.

Issues of morality demarcate Generation II most significantly from their parents: the role of the past, die Vergangenheit, as a protest for generational conflict, experimentation with new forms of sexual expression and household structure, challenges to property relations and social
class, and renewal of the basis of political authority. Each issue, in turn, took on the importance of a moral imperative, and in each case it seems as if, in retrospect, Generation II prevailed, provoking radical changes in kinship law and enlarging the discourse of politics. This story of unfolding progress is not, however, the way they would see their own history.

They saw the use of a succession of social movements to periodize history as a direct challenge to the official version of history in a continuing contestation of nationness. And they saw the significance of free time and vacations as tropes that subverted what they perceived as an obsession with work and production on the part of their parents. Yet the transformation of anarchic form into recognizable resistance was most often less a displacement of what it meant to be (West) German than a movement out of doxa to heterodoxy. Thus it was relatively easy for Generation II to define themselves against the hegemonic definitions of their parents but at the same time risk very little by moving within those definitions. Try as they might, they were not able to jump out of their culture. Consumerism, though in different form than for their parents, brought them back into the fold.

The shift in state narrative strategy in the sixties and seventies, from restoration to desentimentalization, enabled an assimilation of Generation II into the structures of Germanness. Many squatters became property owners, the APO (extra-parliamentary movement) now sat in parliament (as the Alternative Liste and Greens), and many members of Generation II became dependent on the state for employment or welfare payments of one form or another. For them the state’s master narrative of prosperity functioned as an all-purpose aphrodisiac, an elixir of pleasurable things that made digestible otherwise distasteful social and state controls. It pacified many would-be rebels, breeding what the East Germans regarded as an arrogance and confidence that Generation II shared with its parents, making them all the more recognizable West German, and demarcating them from their East German counterparts. This was the work and the legacy of Abgrenzungs politik. The demarcated lifecourse entailed an internalization and routinization of everyday behavioral patterns and operative norms that function like common sense, difficult to articulate with precision, yet forming a social glue that, despite variations by class, gender, and region, bound all West Germans to the Federal Republic.

What Generation II shared with their counterparts in the East, and what most demarcates them from Generation I in both Berlin halves, was a rejection of kinship inscribed in blood and mud, a refusal to grant biology a primordial role in kin formation and thus a centrality in the definition of the nation. For them, much more than for their East Berlin counterparts, the tropes of experimentation and heterogeneity lived on, especially in constructing kin networks. Their relativization of the state’s narrative on ascribed, inherited belonging brought about the possibility for transformation of Germanness to a multicultural or cosmopolitan sense of self.

When the state decentered the Hausfrauenehe, which had been the symbolic focus of kinship law, it was not abnegating its control over marriage and family, but attempting to assimilate heterodox household, partnership, and childcare forms of legal codes without yielding control and influence over them. This shift in strategy was provoked by the tactics of Generation II, specifically of women who challenged the authority of old forms. Unlike their counterparts in the East, West Berlin women had a more antagonistic relationship to the state’s version of their lifecourse. Thus the larger strategy of the Federal Republic since the late sixties was to legitimize selectively heterodox forms by legalizing them, emplotting experiential tropes into its larger master narrative that sought assimilation into hierarchy. The law, in this sense, was quite plastic, increasing its range of influence over forms while yielding on the control of content. For both the state and members of Generation II, this involved a trade-off: the law encompassed more action by dispersing its control, the citizen was given the means to articulate him/herself in a dialogue with the state in many different action domains. A final summary explaining how this dialogue feeds into the narrative about Germanness will be the purpose of the following chapter.
350 Notes to pages 215–248

9 For a critique of Schelsky's generalizations, see Baumert (1954: 184–189). Baumert argues, among other things, that Schelsky overemphasizes the influence of the war on the German family structure, and, contrary to Schelsky, he claims that the processes influencing family construction are reversible since the family itself is an unstable unit.

10 For a discussion of how women experienced and in part internalized this model, see the different aspects in the volume edited by Delliie and Grohn (1985).

11 See Habermas (1961), where he also argues that domination in Western democracies is rooted in a hidden politicization of private life coupled with an appearance of openness in the political domain.

12 See the detailed analysis of family policy in the Third Reich by Mühlfeld and Schönweiss (1989).

13 These ideas are fully in agreement with those expressed in the insightful essays on West German demarcation from the East by Rainer Lepsius (1981: 419) and on German national identity by Wolfgang Mommsen (1987: 300–321), where the tropes of anti-communism and prosperity are discussed.

14 Not all political leaders were content with the state's satirical strategy of encouraging demarcation from the East in and through an unabashed materialism in everyday life in the West. The Christian Democrat Ludwig Erhard, for example, who as the "father of the Wirtschaftswunder" followed Adenauer as Chancellor from 1963 to 1966, called for a return to an idealism (a social-market economy and a formierte Gesellschaft) that could compete with the idealism of the GDR. As Michael Weck (1989) demonstrates, Erhard felt uncomfortable with the "Lutheran-Protestant orgiastic" behavior of his fellow West Germans, embodied above all in the Freßwelle. Erhard thought that prosperity alone was insufficient to legitimate the new state. Weck notes, however, that those Germans who had lived through the idealism of the Nazis were skeptical of idealism of any sort. By the late sixties, Generation II began precisely where Erhard had left off, with a critique of West German materialism.

15 See Heinz Budé's (1987: 86–142) fascinating biography-based analysis of German self-flight, from which I have taken much inspiration.

8 Politicized kinship in West Berlin: Generation II

1 See the interesting ethnography of a musical conservatory by Kingsbury (1988), where he discusses the political context of ascertaining talent.

2 In archival work on this period, one is also confronted with the influence of French existentialist philosophy on the German "beat" culture of the fifties, though I was not able to document this in life reconstructions. From today's standpoint, the American influence is selectively emphasized.

3 For West Germans as of 1988, there was disincentive to avoid military service because West German companies tended to discriminate against men without a service record, and it was increasingly difficult to obtain a training/university position without a record of military or civilian service.

4 Protection of the state, often translated into persecution of Lefties or Communist Party members, was indeed the major argument authorities used since 1949. In the year 1953 alone, 1,634 persons were sentenced to prison terms for "endangering the state," with the justification that this was necessary to protect democracy (Jesse 1986: 28).

5 See the evocative article in the Autonome by Jane Kramer (1989: 67–100).

6 One should not overlook the fact that during this period of state repression, the state was governed by a Social Democratic coalition. Throughout the 1970s the Social Democrats, as the most reform-oriented of the major parties, were "forced" to prove their loyalty to the ideas of the state by reacting in an authoritarian and extremely repressive manner toward dissidents.

7 Despite the existence of class-based models, there was a leveling of class in kin-related aspects of nationness. This is supported by Lüschen (1988: 167–168), who writes that studies since the late sixties show that family relations, support systems, interaction routines, and urban structures are independent of occupation and income. In other words, class-specific aspects of family life have been declining since the late sixties.

8 Descriptions in my own interviews contradict more controlled studies (based on polling, for example), such as the one quoted by Schütze (1988: 124), where few people list children as belonging to a marriage, and the majority of women claim to have children for "joy" or "sense of life." Another way of interpreting the responses to this poll would be that the respondents mean partnership does not belong to having children; instead, they consider children part of a personal relationship, related to fulfilling a concept of self independent of a partner. The questioners in such polls are confusing, and conflating—in response to questions that, I suspect, also confuse and conflate—marriage with partnership. Whereas marriage is, in fact, intimately connected to securing a socially recognized relationship between the individual and the state regarding parental authority and child care, partnership, on the other hand, does not require a legal status. Marriage is, as pointed out above, usually consummated upon pregnancy or in its anticipation; it is not usually entered into merely because the people want to become partners.

9 Similar claims are made in a collection of interpretive essays on the history of socialization techniques since World War II (Preuss-Lausitz, Büchner, and Fischer-Kowalski 1983). The volume is structured around the argument that three generations of children, organized successively around Krieg, Konsum and Krisen (war, consumerism, and crisis), have typified youth in the postwar period.

10 For women of Generation II, opportunities for fulfillment in work, while greater than for their mothers, were still substantially limited due to the structure of the labor market. Despite gains made in the late sixties/early seventies in opening up education and employment for women, their position was still not equal to that of men of the same rank. For example, when unemployment increased from 3.8 to 9.3 percent from 1980 to 1985, women consistently showed 0.9 to 2.5 percent higher unemployment rates than did men (Süßismuth 1988: 231). Women in the eighties partook in the
educational system to the same degree as men did, although this did not translate into the same employment opportunities. This gender-specific employment pattern was especially marked for mothers. While 20 percent of all mothers with children under fifteen were working in 1950, the rate in 1982 had risen to 42.6 percent (Sommerkorn 1988: 117; Claessens, Klönne, and Tschoepe 1985: 409–416), a substantial gain, but still less than half the number in the GDR. Lack of educational opportunities in the fifties left many of the older women of Generation II underemployed or working at jobs rather than in occupations, and their pensions will also be correspondingly low (Claessens, Klönne, and Tschoepe 1985: 360–371). Nonetheless, women and men alike held to the distinction between work and vacation described above.

9 Marriage, family, nation
1 The fact of nationness, of belonging to the nation in the sense defined in this book, does not always translate into nationalism, which involves subjective devotion to the nation. These terms are often confused. States frequently turn to policies that foment nationalism, manipulating the opinions of their citizenry in times of crises to bolster governmental legitimacy, but this type of devotion, often manifested equally in newcomers to the nation as well as longtime members, is as unstable as are all subjective opinions. Nationness, on the other hand, is a subjectivity, not contingent on an opinion or attitude, but derived from lived experience within a state.
2 A household census in East Germany in the early eighties and one in West Germany in 1987 were not entirely successful affairs. Most of my discussion partners in both Berlins reported falsifying or refusing to answer the questionnaires. The fight against the census in West Berlin was led by the Alternative Liste (Greens), who called for a boycott. The state declared this action "against the Constitution," and threatened resisters with monetary fines and imprisonment. All such resisters, estimated at about 25 percent of the total adult population in West Berlin, are now on state-security computer lists under the category "suspected terrorist" or "enemy of the state" (for a manual on West German resistance, see Hauck-Scholz 1987).
3 See the historical study on nations and nationalism by E. J. Hobsbawm (1990).
4 An examination of postwar marriages in the two Berlins illustrates that marriage is the classic example of a non-classic categorization; it simply cannot be described or accounted for in Aristotelian terms. According to Aristotle, concepts are internal representations of external reality. Since concepts correspond to an external, coherent, stable, objective reality, cognitive models have fixed boundaries. Membership within a category is determined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that specify elements, their properties, and the relations between them. Whereas marriage as a Western legal concept fits this particular cognitive model, marriage as practice does not. Actual linguistic and cultural practice in the Berlins indicate a range of marriage types much broader than the legal model.
Postscript: unity
1 See the protocols about the opening by Schabowski and Egon Krenz (politburo members at that time heading the government) in Der Spiegel 43, 1990: 103. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations and statistics in this postscript have been verified in issues of Der Spiegel, the recognized magazine of record in Germany, from October 1989 through April 1991. A lengthier description and analysis of these events can be found in Borneman (1991a).
2 The realization of these desires is, of course, a quite different process from their formulation. It is estimated that only 10 percent of all East Germans vacationed outside the new Germany during 1990. Among Berliners during this period, the number and type of automobiles increased dramatically, from 719,000 to 1.2 million. It is safe to assume that most of these purchases were by East Germans. Paradoxically, buying the West German cars, one-third of which go 50 to 110 percent faster than the GDR speed limit, is killing the East Germans. Accompanying the massive introduction in 1990 of West German autos into the former GDR is an increase in the number of accidents, up 83 percent, with a threefold increase in the deaths of children.
3 Municipal elections held on October 2, 1990 formally absorbed the GDR into the FRG, creating the Five New Länder at the same time. These were seen as a prelude to the federal elections two months later.
4 Kohl said on July 1, 1990, the day of the currency union, "For the people in