Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

Jeremy Bentham

Chapter 9, Footnote #02
More on the Roman Law terminology

I pretend not here to give any determinate explanation of a set of words, of which the great misfortune is,that the import of them is confused and indeterminate. I speak only by approximation. To attempt to determine the precise import that has been given them by a hundredth pant of the authors that have used them, would be an endless task. Would any one talk intelligibly on this subject in Latin? let him throw out dolus altogether: let him keep culpa, for the purpose of expressing not the case itself, but the sentiment that is entertained concerning a case described by other means. For intentionality, let him coin a word boldly, and say intentionalitas: for unintentionality, non-intentionalitas. For unadvisedness, he has already the word inscitia; though the words imprudentia, inobservantia, were it not for the other senses they are used in, would do better: for unadvisedness coupled with heedlessness, let him say inscitia culpabilis for unadvisedness without heedlessness, inscitia inculpabilis: for mis-advisedness coupled with rashness, error culpabilis, error temerarius, or error cum temeritate: for mis-advisedness without rashness, error inculpabilis, error non-temerarius, or error sine temeritate.

It is not unfrequent likewise to meet with the phrase, malo animo: a phrase still more indeterminate, if possible, than any of the former. It seems to have reference either to intentionality, or to consciousness, or to the motive, or to the disposition, or to any two or more of these taken together; nobody can tell; which these being objects which seem to have never hitherto been properly distinguished and defined.

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IPML Chapter 9: Of Consciousness