(a) [Springs of action.] 1. Under this denomination, those objects and considerations alone are included in this Table, which, in their operation on the will, act as it were in the way of immediate contact. Concerning those which act on the will no otherwise than through the understanding, see Note (m) on the word Motives.
2. The words here employed as leading terms, are names of so many psychological entities, mostly fictitious, framed by necessity for the purpose of discourse. Add, and even of thought: for, without corresponding words to clothe them in, ideas could no more be fixed, or so much as fashioned, than communicated.
3. By habit, wherever a man sees a name, he is led to figure to himself a corresponding object, of the reality of which the name is accepted by him, as it were of course, in the character of a certificate. From this delusion, endless is the confusion, the error, the dissension, the hostility, that has been derived.
4. Of all these groups or classes of intimately connected psychological entities, to motives alone is the appellation Springs of action immediately applicable---to the others, no otherwise than in virtue of the relation they respectively bear to Motives.
5. Psychological dynamics (by this name may be called the science, which has for its subject these same springs of action, considered as such) has for its basis psychological pathology. Pleasure and exemption from pain fall to be considered every where in the character of ends: pleasure and pain here in the character of means.
(b) [Pleasures.] Synonyms to the word pleasure: including those by which are designated the corresponding states of mind, and their respective causes. 1. Gratification. 2. Enjoyment. 3. Fruition. 4. Indulgence. 5. Joy. 6. Delight. 6*. Delectation. 7. Hilarity. 8. Merriment. 9. Mirth. 10. Gaiety. 11. Airiness. 12. Comfort. 13. Solace. 14. Content. 15. Satisfaction. 16. Rapture. 17. Transport. 18. Ecstasy. 19. Bliss. 20. Joyfulness. 21. Gladness. 22. Gladfulness. 23. Gladsomeness. 24. Cheerfulness. 25. Comfortableness. 26. Contentedness. 27. Happiness. 28. Blissfulness. 29. Felicity. 30. Well-being. 31. Prosperity. 32. Success. 33. Exultation. 34. Triumph. 35. Amusement. 36. Entertainment. 37. Diversion. 38. Festivity. 39. Pastime. 40. Sport. 41. Play. 42. Frolic. 43.Recreation. 44.Refreshment. 45. Ease. 46. Repose. 47. Rest. 48. Tranquillity. 49. Quiet. 50. Peace. 51. Relief. 52. Relaxation. 53. Alleviation. 54. Mitigation.
(c) [Pains.] Synonyms to the word pain: including those by which are designated the correspondent states of mind and their respective causes. 1. Vexation. 2. Suffering. 3. Mortification. 4. Humiliation. 5. Sorrow. 6. Grief. 7. Mourning. S. Concern. 9. Distress. 10. Discomfort. 11. Discontent. 12, Dissatisfaction. 13. Regret. 14. Anguish. 15, Agony. 16. Torture. 17. Torment. 18. Pang. 19. Throe. 20. Excruciation. 21. Distraction. 22. Trouble. 23. Embarrassment. 24. Anxiety. 25. Solicitude. 26. Perplexity. 27. Disquiet. 28. Disquietude. 29. Inquietude. 30. Unquietness 31. Discomposure. 32. Disturbance. 33. Commotion. 34. Agitation. 35. Perturbation 36. Disorder. 37. Harassment. 38. Restlessness. 39. Uneasiness. 40. Discontentedness. 41. Anxiousness. 42. Sorrowfulness. 43. Sadness. 44. Weariness. 45. Mournfulness. 46. Bitterness. 47. Unhappiness 48. Wretchedness. 49. Misery. 50. Infelicity. 51. Melancholy. 52. Gloom. 53. Depression. 54. Dejection. 55. Despondence 56. Despondency. 57. Despair. 58. Desperation. 59. Hopelessness. 60. Affliction. 61. Calamity. 62. Plague. 63. Grievance. 64. Misfortune. 65. Mishap. 66. Misadventure. 67. Mischance.
2. Note, that in many instances the transient sensation, the permanent state of mind, and the cause of one or both, are designated by the same word.
3. In the plural number, in some instances, the word is scarcely in use.
4. In some instances, different modification of the principal idea, as above, are designate by the two numbers. See for example under Pleasure, Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
5. Fully to delineate and illustrate these and other observable modes of difference would require a volume.
6. Use of these synonyms. It is only by means of its relation to objects designated by other names, that the nature of any object can be made known: proportioned to the number of the names brought to view, is the number of the relations here exhibited. Synonymation is denomination. By denomination, to an extent proportioned to that of the denominatives employed, the work of classification is performed. In physics, right denomination and right conception,---and, so far as depends upon right conception, right practice,---are acknowledged to be inseparable. By identity of denomination, identity of nature, i. e. of properties; by diversity, diversity is declared.
7. Constructed in different languages, a Table of this sort would afford an interesting specimen of their comparative copiousness and expressiveness.
8. Of the value of a pleasure, the elements or ingredients are, 1. Its intensity: 2. Its duration (of these two its magnitude is composed:) 3. Its certainty (say rather its probability:) 4. Its propinquity or nearness (measurable no otherwise than by the opposite quality, its remoteness;) in both which cases, by the supposition, it is not present: 5. Its purity, which is inversely as the value of any pain or pains, loss or losses (viz. of pleasure), in such sort associated with it, as that, in case of his experiencing the pleasure, a man will experience them, otherwise not: 6. Its fecundity, which is directly as the value of any pleasure or pleasures, exemption or exemptions (viz. from pain), which, in case of his experiencing the pleasure, he will experience, otherwise not: 7. Its extent, which is as the number of the persons, by whom a pleasure of the sort in question, produced by the individual event or state of things in question which is the cause of the pleasure, is experienced.
9. Apply this to reward, to punishment, to compensation; to the matter of good and the matter of evil employed to those respective purposes. In so far as this application is neglected, the business of law and government is carried on blindfold.
10. Positive good (understand pathological good) is either pleasure itself, or a cause of pleasure: negative good, either exemption from pain, or a cause of such exemption.
11. In like manner, positive evil is either pain itself, or a cause of pain: negative evil, either loss of pleasure, or a cause of such loss.
12. In the character of an interest---a desire---a motive---equivalent to, and thence equipollent with, a given pleasure, may be exemption from a given pain:---say for simplicity's sake an exemption: equivalent to a given pain, loss of a given pleasure:---say for simplicity's sake, a loss.
13. Moral good is, as above, pathological good, in so far as human will is considered as instrumental in the production of it: in so far as any thing else is made of it, either the word is without meaning, or the thing is without value. And so in regard to evil.
14. For pathological might here have been put the more ordinary adjunct physical, were it not that, in that case, those pleasures and pains, the seat of which is not in the body, but only in the mind, might be regarded as excluded.
15. Take away pleasures and pains, not only happiness, but justice, and duty, and obligation, and virtue---all which have been so elaborately held up to view as independent of them---are so many empty sounds.
16. As a spring of action, a pleasure cannot operate, but in so far as, in the particular direction in question, action is regarded as a means of obtaining it; a pain, in so far as action is regarded as a means of avoiding it.
17. In so far as it happens not to operate as a spring of action, a pleasure may be termed inert. Pleasures which in their very nature are inert, are: 1. All pleasures of mere recollection. 2. All pleasures of mere imagination. 3. Even pleasures of expectation, when the expected pleasure is regarded as certain, and not capable of being by action either brought nearer or increased. And so it is with pains.
18. In a remote way, indeed, it may happen to any such pleasure, howsoever in itself inert, to give birth to action: but then it is only by means of some different pleasure, happens to bring to view.
19. In itself, the pleasure derived, for example, from a recollected landscape, is an inert one. An effect of it may indeed be the sending a man again to the place to take another view. But, in that case, the operating pleasure---the actuating motive---is a different one: viz. the pleasurable idea of the pleasurable sensation expected from that other view.
(d) [Original.] 1. viz. as opposed to derivative. By the adjunct original, may be distinguished such pleasures as are the immediate and simultaneous accompaniments of perception: viz. physical, i. e. corporeal, or merely psychological, i. e. mental:---and so of pains.
2. By the adjunct derivative, such as are not accompaniments of perception, viz. of present perception, but are derived from past perception:---and so of pains.
3. Derived from past perception, they are fruit of memory (i. e. of recollection), or of imagination: of memory, in so far as they are copies of an entire picture: of imagination, in so far as they are copies taken in the way of abstraction, from detached parts of any picture;---those parts being taken either, each by itself, or mixed up together, along with parts taken in like manner from other pictures.
4. Derived from imagination, if the conception formed of them be accompanied with a judgment more or less decided---a persuasion more or less intense---of the future realization of the pictures so composed, the imagination is styled expectation: and the pleasure, if any there be, which is the immediate accompaniment of such persuasion, is styled a pleasure of expectation, or a pleasure of hope: if not so accompanied, a pleasure of imagination, and nothing more. And so of pains: except that pains of expectation have for their synonyms, not pains of hope, but pains of apprehension.
5. Thus, it is no otherwise than through the medium of the imagination, that any pleasure, or any pain, is capable of operating in the character of a motive. It is only through the medium of these derivative representations that the past original can, in any shape, or in any part, be brought to view.
6. Note, that in the way of imagination, from original pleasures may be derived not pleasures only but likewise pains. Pain, for example, is a natural accompaniment of the recollected idea of the past pleasure, when the expectation is that it will not be---as pleasure is, when the expectation is that it will be---again realized. And so in the case of pains.
(e) [simple.] 1. The pleasures and pains here brought to view are, every one of them, simple and elementary. Out of these, others in any number may be compounded; and for the compound so made, appropriate denominations may be, and in an indefinite number have been framed; giving, each of them, to the compound object, especially in so far as the denomination employed is single-worded, the aspect of a simple one. For example, in Note (r), Pleasures of the bottle: 2. Love (the sexual) considered as a motive. 3. Love of justice. 4. Love of liberty.
2. Objection. The pleasures and pains styled, as above, simple, are not so in every instance: for, under the import of the word physical pleasure (No. 3.), physical pleasures of all sorts, with the several motives, are included.
Answer. The pleasure which, on any individual occasion, is here considered as being in question is not the less simple: for, on the occasion here supposed, no more than one such pleasure is as being in prospect, though that one may be of any one of the species comprised under the class designated by the word in question, viz. physical. Whether of this same class, or of any other class, or of any two classes, suppose two pleasures operating on the same occasion in the character of motives, then, and then only is it, that to the pleasure and to the correspondent motive, the epithet compound, in the sense in which it is here employed, is applicable.
(f) [Interest.] 1. A man is said to have an interest in any subject, in so far as that subject is considered as more or less likely to be to him a source of pleasure or exemption:---subject, viz. thing or person; thing, in virtue of this or that use which it may happen to him to derive from that thing, person, in virtue of this or that service, which it may happen to him to receive at the hands of that person.
2. A man is said to have an interest in the performance of this or that act, by himself or any other---or in the taking place of this or that event or state of things,---in so far as, upon and in consequence of its having place, this or that good (i. e. pleasure or exemption) is considered as being more or less likely to be possessed by him.
3. It is said to be a man's interest that the act, the event, or the state of things in question should have place, in so far as it is supposed that---upon, and in consequence of, its having place---good, to a greater value, will be possessed by him than in the contrary case. In the former case, interest corresponds to a single item in the account of good and evil; in the latter case, it corresponds to a balance on the side of good.
4. For the word interest no synonyms have been found.
(g) [Desires.] Synonyms to the word desire. 1. Wish (to, or for.) 2. Appetite (for.) 3. Craving (for.) 4. Longing (for, or after.) 5. Coveting (of, or for.) 6. Liking (to, or for.) 7. Inclination (to, or for.) 8. Regard (for.) 9. Affection (for.) 10. Attachment (to.) 11. Love (of, or for.) 12. Hankering (after.) 13. Propensity (to, or towards.) 14. Zeal (for, or in behalf of.) 15. Eagerness (for.) 16. Anxiety (for.)
(h) [Aversions.] Synonyms to the word aversion. 1. Dislike (of, to, or for.) 2. Distaste (of, or for.) 3. Disgust (at.) 4. Antipathy (against, or towards.) 5. Loathing (of.) 6. Abhorrence (of.) 7. Detestation (of.) 8. Execration. 9. Hatred (of, or towards.)
(i) [Wants.] Synonyms to the word want are: 1. Need (of.) 2. Demand (for.) 3. Exigency. 4. Necessity.
(k) [Hopes.] Synonyms to the word hope. 1. Expectation (of, or from.) 2. Prospect (of, or from).
(l) [Fears.] 1. Synonyms to the word fear. Apprehension (of, for, or about.) 2. Dread (of.) 3. Terror. 4. Horror (of.) 5. Solicitude (for, or about, or concerning.) 6. Anxiety (for, or about.) 7. Suspicion (of, or about.)
2. As desire is to pleasure (and its expected causes), so is aversion to pain and its expected causes. So, as to hope and fear.
3. Want bears a common reference to pleasure and to pain: satisfied, it produces pleasure; unsatisfied, pain; though capable of being overbalanced by the pleasure of hope, i. e. of expectation.
4. Need, demand, exigency, necessity, may exist without any corresponding desire: so likewise want, in so far as it is synonymous to these four appellatives without being so to desire. Exposed to danger, a man has need of, and so far is in want of, all necessary means of safety: but, so long as he is ignorant of the danger, he has no desire of or for any of them.
5. As hope is to pleasure and exemption, so is fear to pain and loss.
6. Expectation and prospect are, without self-contradiction, applicable to pain, to loss, and to their supposed causes: hope, not.
(m) [Motives.] 1. Synonyms to the word motive. 1. Inducement. 2. Incitement. 3. Incentive. 4. Spur. 5. Invitation. 6. Solicitation. 7. Allurement. 8. Enticement. 9. Temptation.
2. Motives to the will---motives to the understanding:---note well the difference. Motive to the will a desire---the corresponding desire---operating in the character of a motive: motive to the understanding, any consideration,---the apparent tendency of which is to give increase to the efficiency of the desire, in the character of a motive to the will.
Of the modifications of good and evil, capable of operating in the character of motives to the will, this Table presents a view: Of the corresponding considerations capable of operating, in subservience to the several motives to the will, in the character of motives to the understanding, no book could comprise the catalogue.
3. To the head of motives to the understanding belong means.
4. The desire existing, whatsoever, in the character of a means, promises to be contributory to the attainment of the end (i. e. to the possession of the pleasure or the exemption which is the object of the desire), operates in the character of an incentive, i. e. a motive: viz. by giving increase to the apparent value of the good in respect of certainty.
5. As by judgment, desire is influenced, by desire, judgment: witness interest-begotten prejudice:---the tendency of the influence being, in the first case regular and salutary, rightly instructive and directive; in the other case irregular, and naturally sinister, deceptious, and seductive.
6. Motives to the understanding operate as such in every case on the will: else they would not be motives. The converse does not hold good. Antecedently to action (the actions termed involuntary excepted), the will is, in every case, perceptibly in exercise: not so the understanding.
7. In so far as the effect or tendency of the desire is to restrain action, not to produce it, the term motive cannot be employed without a contradiction in terms. Unfortunately, the word restrictive, though in the form of an adjective it is, in the form of a substantive is not, as yet in the language.
8. Of the sorts of psychological powers brought to view in this Table under the appellation of motives, three at least, viz. No. 8 (regard for reputation, &c.) No. 9 (piety), and No. 10 (sympathy), will be found to be more frequently and extensively, as well as more usefully, employed to the purpose of restraint, than to that of incitement---as restrictives than as motives. In comparison of the degree of efficiency, with which man's power of producing unhappiness, small indeed is that with which his power of producing happiness is capable of being employed. By the power of the political sanction, almost all the pleasures and pains of which man's nature is susceptible, thence almost all the motives to the action of which he is sensible, are capable of being applied to the purpose of restraint: but, except in so far as they are so employed by that power, incitement alone is the purpose, to which, in the character of springs of action (as the term springs of action imports) the motives under the governance of which man is placed, are mostly employed. All perform alike the office of a spur: upon these few rests principally the charge of performing the office of a bridle.
9. Pleasure, pain, &c.---connection between the respective imports of these several appellatives.
When to a man's enjoying a certain good, i. e. a certain pleasure or exemption from a certain pain---it has appeared to him to be necessary that a certain event or state of things should have had place; and, for the purpose of causing it to have place, he has performed a certain act; then so it is, that among the psychological phenomena, which, on the occasion in question, have had place and operation in his mind, are the following, viz. 1. He has felt himself to have an interest in the possession of that same good. 2. He has felt a desire to possess it. 3. He has felt an aversion to the idea of his not possessing it. 4. He has felt the want of it. 5. He has entertained a hope of possessing it. 6. He has had before his eyes the fear of not possessing it. 7. And the desire he has felt of possessing it has operated on his will in the character of a motive, by the sole operation, or by the help of which, the act exercised by him, as above, has been produced.
10. Such has been the state of the case, of whatsoever nature the pleasure or the pain in question has been: whether of the self-regarding or of the extra-regarding class: if the extra-regarding class, whether of the social, or of the dissocial order or genus.
11. Thus it is, that these intimately connected, but not otherwise commensurable, appellatives serve for the exposition of each other: no one of these having any superior genus, nor consequently being susceptible of the only species of exposition as yet in common use, viz. that which is called a definition, and is performed by the assignment of some word expressive of a superior genus, of which word in question denotes a species.
12. To the will it is that the idea of a pleasure or an exemption applies itself in the first instance; in that stage its effect, if not conclusive, is velleity: by velleity, reference is made to the understanding, viz. 1. For striking a balance between the value of this good, and that of the pain or loss, if any, which present themselves as eventually about to stand associated with it: 2. Then, if the balance appears to be in its favour for the choice of means: thereupon, if action be the result, velleity is perfected into volition, of which the correspondent action is the immediate consequence. For the process that has place this description may serve alike in all cases: time occupied by it may be of any length; from a minute fraction of a second, as in ordinary cases, to any number of years.
(n) [eulogistic] (o) [dyslogistic] (p) [neutral.] I. Eulogistic or dyslogistic, any such appellative may in either case be termed censorial.
2. Thus it is that, in addition to the import which, in the character of a simple term, properly belongs to it, will be found involved in every such censorial appellation the import of at least one entire proposition: viz. a proposition expressive of a judgment of approbation or disapprobation, as above.
3. Various, and as yet seldom altogether determinate, are the grounds on which this judgment seems to have been framed:---1. A supposed excess of intensity on the part of the desire: (See Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14.) 2. A supposed impropriety in the choice of the subject, on which the act from which the pleasure is expected to be derived is exercised: (See No. 2.) 3. A supposed impropriety in the nature of the act, i. e. in so far as the imputed impropriety has any intelligible grounds, a supposed mischievousness---a balance on the side of evil (pathological evil) on the part of its consequences. See the above, and the several other instances.
4. On this occasion, to take the case of a dyslogistic appellative, the error, in so far as there is any, consists in this: viz. that, on account of some accidental effect, which, on this or that occasion, has been observed to be produced by the desire, the whole corresponding group of psychological entities---pleasure, interest, desire, motive---are, on all occasions, by the undistinguishing and uneludible force of this condemnatory appellative, involved in one common and undistinguishing censure: and, vice versâ, when the censorial appellative is of the eulogistic cast, whatsoever mischievous effects are liable, and apt, to be produced by the desire, are covered and kept out of sight: whereas, to a truly enlightened, as well as sincerely benevolent mind, it will appear, that, on each individual occasion, it is by the probable balance in the account of utility, whether of pleasure or of pain, that the judgment, whether it be of approbation or of disapprobation, ought to be determined.
(q) [impassioned.] 1. Between such as are simply censorial and such as are moreover impassioned, the line will almost every where be necessarily and irremediably indeterminate: on the question to which of the two classes the appellative belongs, the decision therefore cannot but be in a proportionable degree arbitrary.
2. Passion being among the causes of wrong judgment and consequent misconduct, any intimation of the existence of any such feeling, in the breast of him by whom the appellative is applied, may on that score have its practical use.
3. Having, without the form, the force of an assumption,---and having for its object, and but too commonly for its effect, a like assumption on the part of the hearer or reader,---the sort of allegation in question, how so ill-grounded soever, is, when thus masked, apt to be more persuasive than when expressed simply and in its own proper form: especially where, to the character of a censorial adding the quality and tendency of an impassioned allegation, it tends to propagate, as it were by contagion, the passion by which it was suggested. On this occasion, it seeks and finds support in that general opinion, of the existence of which the eulogistic or dyslogistic sense, which thus, as it were by adhesion, has connected itself with the import of the appellative, operates as proof.
4. Applied to the several springs of action, and in particular to pleasures and to motives, these censorial and impassioned appellatives form no inconsiderable part of the ammunition employed in the war of words.
5. Under the direction of sinister interest and interest-begotten prejudice, they have been employed in the character of fallacies, or instruments of deception, by polemics of all classes:---by politicians, lawyers, writers on controversial divinity, satirists, and literary censors.
6. Causes of the comparative numbers of censorial and neutral names of motives. Eulogistic appellatives; in some instances abundant, in others rare or wanting: so likewise, dyslogistic; in some instances both abundant: neutral appellatives; in most instances either rare or wanting:---such are among the observations which the contents of this Table may be apt to suggest. Of so remarkable a diversity, where (it may be asked) are we to look for the cause?---Answer, In the interest, which, on the several occasions, in their character of makers and employers of language, men have understood themselves to have, in propagating the persuasion which, by the appellatives respectively in question, has been endeavoured to be impressed.---Of this proposition, the proof will, it is supposed, be seen in the following paper, entitled OBSERVATIONS.
N. B. Where on this occasion appellatives are said to be wanting, understand single-worded ones: by combinations of words, no assignable object for which appellatives may not be found.
(r) [Compound Pleasures exemplified.]
Example I. Pleasures of the bottle.---No. I.---COMPONENT ELEMENTS, commonly conjoined in this aggregate, are: 1. Pleasure of the palate; viz. from the taste of the liquor.---2. Pleasure of exhilaration; viz. of what may be termed physical or pharmaceutic exhilaration:---seat of it, the nervous system in general (No 1.)---3. Pleasure of sympathy or good-will (No. 10.) viz. as towards co-partakers, the compotators.
Example II. Love, (the passion).---COMPONENT ELEMENTS---1. Sexual desire (No. 2.) 2. Ditto. enhanced by particular beauty. 3. Desire of good-will (No. 7.) viz. the goodwill of the person beloved; including the indefinite train of services, of which it may be the imagined and expected source: 4. Goodwill itself; viz. towards that same person (No. 10.) or say sympathy: viz. in contemplation of the qualities, intellectual or moral, ascribed to that same person, &c. &c.
Example III. Love of justice.---COMPONENT ELEMENTS---1. In so far as it is to the individual in question, that, in the instance in question, the benefit of justice accrues, Desire of self-preservation (No. 13.) 2. Sympathy (No. 10.) for this or that other individual, considered as being, on the occasion in question, or on other similar ones, liable to become a sufferer by the opposite injustice. 3. Sympathy (No. 10.) for the community at large, in respect of the interest which it has in the maintenance of justice: i. e. as being liable, in an indefinite extent, to become a sufferer by injustice. 4. Antipathy (No. 9.) towards any other person or persons, considered as profiting, or being in a way to profit, by the opposite injustice. 5. Antipathy (No. 9.) towards any other person, who, in the character of a judge, is considered as concerned, or about to be concerned, in giving existence or effect to the injustice.
Example IV. Love of liberty: viz. constitutional liberty, or rather (to speak more distinctly) security.---COMPONENT ELEMENTS---1. Desire of self-preservation (No. 13.) viz. against misrule and its effects. 2. Sympathy (No. 10.) viz. that which has for its object the community at large, considered as liable to be made to suffer from the misrule. 3. Sympathy (No. 10.) towards this or that individual, considered as being, or having been, or about to be, or liable to be, on the occasion in question, or other similar one, a particular sufferer from the misrule;---4. Antipathy (No. 9.) towards individuals, viz. in the character of lovers and supporters, creators or preservers, of misrule; and partakers, actual or expected, in the fruits of it. 5. Love of power (No. 5.) ex. gr. in respect of the influence exercised,---immediately or through the medium of the understanding,---on the wills of persons on the same side; or, in the way of intimidation, on the wills or sensibilities of persons on the opposite side.
In the same manner may be analyzed---and resolved into the simple and elementary pleasures, of which they are composed,---other complex pleasures, agreeing with, and differing from, one another, in endless variety, according to the nature of the sources from whence they are respectively derived: ex. gr. 1. Pleasures of the ball-room:---2. Pleasures of the theatre:---3. Pleasures of the fine arts,---whether severally produced, or conjunctively, in modes, proportion, and groups indefinitely diversifiable.
Note that,---according to the nature of the instrument, by means of which, or of the channel, through which, any such complex pleasure is considered as being capable of being experienced,---the desire may be resolvable into the desire, corresponding to this or that one in the catalogue of the more simple pleasures. For instance into (No. 4.) desire of the matter of wealth;---(No. 7.) desire of amity;---(No. 8.) desire of reputation.[Back to:] Table, Entry 14 Pleasures and Pains of the Self-Regarding Class