§3. The first question is, who is to choose? Is the electorate to be coextensive with the adult portion of the community, or, if not, what classes are to be excluded, and on what ground?
It is obvious that the general arguments for a representative legislature lead prima facie to the inclusion of all sane adults: if any class is deprived of representation, the advantages aimed at in the institution are lost so far as this class is concerned. Indeed, there may be even more danger that the special needs of such a class will be neglected and its special interests sacrificed, by a legislature representing other classes exclusively, than there would be under a despotism; since a despot, has less motive than an assembly representing only a portion of the community for dividing unequally any natural, concern that he may feel for the interests of those whom he governs. This is the fundamental objection to any attempt to improve the quality of a representative legislature by restricting what is called the ``suffrage'', ``franchise'', or ``active'' electoral privilege-i.e. the right of voting, as distinct from the right of being voted for. A further objection lies in the sense of injustice that such an excluded class is likely to feel in consequence of its unequal treatment.
Still these objections are not decisive, from a utilitarian point of view: in particular they may be repelled or outweighed by special proof, either (1) that the class in question will not suffer by exclusion because its interests will be adequately cared for by the representatives of those included, or (2) that it is likely to make a dangerously bad use of the vote. The first of these arguments may be fairly used in support of exclusion on the score of youth and inexperience: since the natural concern of fathers for sons will suffice to prevent any material danger that the class thus excluded will suffer through a sacrifice of their interests to the interests of other men. A similar argument has some force in the case of women, owing to the intimate relations of affection that bind them to men: it may be plausibly urged that the political interests of wives, daughters, and sisters are safe in the hands of husbands, fathers, and brothers. The argument, however, is obviously least applicable to the considerable minority of adult women---spinsters and widows---who are thrown on their own resources for a livelihood: and it is not supported, even in the case of wives, by the practice of the wealthier classes in framing marriage-settlements, since elaborate care is usually taken to protect the pecuniary interests of the wife against the misconduct of her husband. I do not know any other numerically important class of sane self-supporting adults in whose case the argument---so far as it is used to justify permanent exclusion---is even plausible in a modern state.
The second argument---that the excluded class will make a dangerously bad use of the vote---is therefore the more important; and it seems worth while to examine in detail the different species of such misuse that are chiefly dangerous.
Firstly, this bad use may be (a) morally perverted, or (b) merely intellectually mistaken. Of the former misuse the three chief kinds are caused respectively by intimidation, bribery, and immoral demagogy. The patriotic voter will obviously vote for the candidate whom he regards as most competent to promote the wellbeing of the community by legislation; but it is in accordance with the general principle on which representative government is based, that in estimating the candidate's competence he should have particular regard for the special political interests of the section of the community to which he belongs, and aim especially at securing an intelligent concern for these:---though he ought, of course, not to desire that these special interests should be promoted at the expense of justice and the common good. Now, if the elector is in such a position that a candidate or his friends may seriously injure him without open illegality, and without material sacrifice to themselves, there is an obvious danger that his private interest may be artificially weighted,---e.g. by fear of dismissal, loss of custom, exclusion from employment, etc.---so as to induce him to vote for a candidate whom he does not really trust as a protector of his political interests. In this case the vote is perverted by intimidation.
Again, if the elector is poor, his concern for his political interests may be similarly outweighed by a bribe which the candidate or his friends may afford without material sacrifice. This, of course, is all the more probable in proportion as the elector is unenlightened as to his real political interests: still, it cannot be said that the danger of bribery proceeds entirely from want of enlightenment; since it may easily be that the probable difference, as affecting his private interests, between the kinds of legislation offered by competing political parties ought reasonably to be valued at less than the sum of money which the candidate is willing to offer. But the object of giving him a vote is not simply to secure his private interests, but to secure the presence in the legislative organ of the varied knowledge and intelligent concern for all sections of the community that is necessary for good legislation: and this aim is defeated so far as the elector yields to bribery.
It is, however, a still worse form of bribery if the candidate tempts the elector with promises to further his political interests by legislation which both know to be contrary to the general good: since against the candidate who merely bribes pecuniarily we have only a certain general presumption that he is not likely to be a good legislator, but a candidate who bribes by promising mischievous measures has definitely pledged himself to be a bad one. This third perversion of the vote I call immoral demagogy.
It is to be observed, however, that even where the demagogue is dishonest, the elector may be honest but mistaken: he may believe that the legislation promised him is just and conducive to the common good, and may vote legitimately according to his lights. Or, again, the demagogue who is promising to further the sinister interests of a class may himself be honest but mistaken: he may be a charlatan who genuinely believes himself to be a statesman. The danger that under a widely-extended suffrage the ultimate interest of the community may be sacrificed to the real or merely apparent interests of the numerical majority may occur through any of these modes of demagogy; and in a community not radically demoralised the danger from the two latter modes is likely to be greater than from immoral demagogy recognized as such.
Now intimidation---when the conduct feared is of a kind that cannot be treated as illegitimate apart from evidence of its motive---is very difficult to put down by legal penalties, as the fear may easily be produced without express threats. It may, however, be partly prevented by the secrecy of the ballot; and the importance of preventing it is, in my opinion, a decisive argument for secret voting in spite of the strong objections that may be urged against it. Still, even this prevention cannot be made complete, since in many cases the way in which an elector has voted may be inferred, with a high degree of probability, from his own words and actions or those of others; and if there is a strong probability that a particular class will vote in a particular way, such a class, when in a small minority, are liable to incur private risks by merely venturing to go to the ballot-box. Bribery, again, may---more easily than intimidation---be partly put down by penalties: but the difficulty of legally preventing an exchange into which both parties are desirous to enter is shown by experience to be very great in private transactions, and it is therefore likely that the purchase of votes will always go on to some extent, at least until a considerable improvement has taken place in public morality. Nor is it probable that any efforts to disseminate truth and sound reasoning are likely to put down demagogy altogether. Hence it must be recognised as possible that on these grounds the disadvantages of giving the suffrage to poor, dependent, and ignorant persons may outweigh the disadvantages of excluding them. Whether this is likely to be the case at any particular time and place it does not belong to general theory to decide. The decision will partly depend on a consideration which I have not yet taken into account---the intensity of the desire to exercise the franchise felt by the excluded class. For where this desire is weak, not only is the risk from exclusion less, since this cannot cause much discontent; but the risk from inclusion is greater, since persons who have no genuine consciousness of political interests needing defence lack the normal motives to legitimate voting, and are therefore more in danger of perversion. If their political interests are not actually suffering from their exclusion, the most pressing reason for giving them a vote vanishes: if their interests are suffering, and it is only the consciousness of their need that is wanting, it is a case for agitation rather than immediate enfranchisement.
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