Notes and References

 

1. Governments below the level of the state possess only those powers directly or indirectly granted to them by the respective state government. This delegation of power is known as Dillon's Rule after the judge ruling in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad Company (1868)

2. Swiss, James E., 1984, Intergovernmental Program Delivery: Structuring Incentives for Efficiency, in Golembiewski, R. T. and A Wildavsky (eds), The Costs of Federalism, (Transaction Books: New Brunswick)

3. Andrews, Richard N. L., 1984, Economics and Environmental Decisions, Past and Present, in Smith, Kerry V. (ed), Environmental Policy under Reagan's Executive Order, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill)

4. Boruch, R. F. and J.S. Cecil (ed), 1983, Solutions to Ethical and Legal Problems in Social Research, (Academic Press: New York)

5. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, ACIR, has proposed five criteria for federal government decentralization: national purpose, economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness. See: ACIR, 1981, An Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidence and Competence, (A86), (US Government Printing Office: Washington). In this book no weight is placed on national purpose. The only consideration of equity is social inheritance and equal treatment before the law as modified by the need for experimental variation. Political accountability is considered separately in the general design of government and administrative effectiveness is considered part of economic efficiency.

6. An alternative method to achieve a more uniform decentralization would be for the smaller states to form compacts with the larger states. This approach will not be explored in this book.

7. Bowman, Ann O'M. and Richard C. Kearney, 1986, The Resurgence of the States, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs)

8. See Chapter 7 of reference 7

9. For an argument supporting this position see: Hoenack, Stephen A., 1989, Group Behavior and Economic Growth, Social Science Quarterly, pp 744-758. This line of reasoning is obviously in conflict with Olson, Mancur, 1982, The Rise and Decline of Nations, (Yale University Press: New Haven). Freedom of location and the implementation of a professional review would tend to promote competitive, growth oriented government.

10. For a discussion of alternative approaches, see: Siebert, Horst, 1987, Economics of the Environment, 2nd Edition, (Springer-Verlag: NewYork)

11. Harrington, W. and A. J. Krunpnick, 1981, Stationary Source Pollution Policy and Choices for Reform, in Peskin, H. M., P.R. Portney and A. V. Kneese (eds), Environmental Regulation and the U.S. Economy, (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore) 16. Among the first to recognize the virtues of the complex urban political economy were Bish and Ostrom. See: Bish, R. L. and V. Ostrom, 1973, Understanding Urban Government, (American Enterprise Institute: Washington)

12. For a discussion of worker safety issues, see: Chelius, James R., 1977, Workplace Safety and Health: The Role of Workers' Compensation, (American Enterprise Institute: Washington)

13. A good program of safety incentives can greatly reduce accidents and for some individual firms can be economically justified by the decrease in experience-rated workers' compensation premiums. See: Kendall, Richard M., 1986, Incentive Programs with a Competitive Edge, Occupational Hazards, March, pp 41-45. However, Chelius and Smith performed a statistical study in which they did not observe an experience-rating effect on employer behavior. See: Chelius, James R and Robert S. Smith, 1983, Experience-Rating and Injury Prevention, in Worrall, John D.(ed), Safety and the Work Force, (ILR Press: Ithaca)

14. Indeed, if economic compensation is set too high, workers are encouraged to seek workers' compensation as a substitute for working. See: Worrall, John D.(ed), Safety and the Work Force, (ILR Press: Ithaca) One the other hand compensation should be commensurate with the magnitude of the loss of income and be adjusted for inflation.

15. For an extensive discussion of alternative arrangements see: Salvas, E.S., 1987, Privatization: The Key to Better Government, (Chatham House Publishers, Inc.: Chatham)

16. Four levels of government is assumed optimal for a bounded rational voter with limited resources. This assumption would be empirically tested by a wide variation in the political organization of local government in urban areas. Only the assumed ideal organization will be discussed.

17. In rural areas the large area-wide government that corresponded to the urban metropolitan government would be the district government. Below this level would be county governments for rural areas, and towns for incorporated areas. A large rural area unified by a shared interest, such as livestock production, would have a district government whose territory shifting in accordance with economic growth patterns. As most people live in urban areas the discussion in the text will consider only the metropolitan governments.

18. This approach has been proposed by Demsetz, Stigler and Posner in separate papers. See: Demsetz, H, 1968, Why Regulate Utilities?, Journal of Law and Economics, vol 11, pp 55-66; Stigler, George J., 1968, The Organization of Industry, (Richard D. Irwin, Inc: Homewood); and Posner, R.A., 1974, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, Bell Journal of Economics and Managements Science, Vol 5, pp 335-358.

19. See Roth Gabriel, 1987, Private Provision of Public Services, (Oxford University Press: New York)

20. An extensive list is contained in reference 15.

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