I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p. 134) the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that Happiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (=sum of pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a ``Chief Good'' must be ``something of which some being can be conceived in possession''---something, that is, which he can have all at once. On considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as it is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion `a Chief Good' (or `Summum Bonum'), which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter used the notion of `Ultimate Good': as I can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is Good or Desirable per se, and necessarily be capable of being possessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a Good of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of human existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.

ME Book 3 Chapter 14 Section 5